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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. 
The first chapter examines the frequency of banking crisis is statistically 
significantly correlated to growth for the time windows of 1 decade and 2 decades, this 
negative relationship becoming increasingly more statistically insignificant overall for time 
windows from 3 decades to 10 decades before finally becoming positive, though 
statistically insignificant, for the time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample. 
The frequency of currency crisis is statistically significantly negatively associated with 
growth overall for the time windows of 1 decade to 10 decades, before becoming 
insignificantly positive for time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample. 
The second chapter examines the effect of capital account openness on growth 
using two measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and The 
Chinn-Ito Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had a positive effect on 
5-year average growth, 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth based on panel
analyses, but an insignificant even negative effect on growth in the long run based on cross-
sectional regressions. The results are robust to controlling country dummy and time 
dummy. 
The third chapter uses data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital 
to GDP and ratio of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to 
explore long run and short run causality relationship between income inequality and 
growth. My findings show there exist neither long run nor short run causality link between 
Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Banking Crisis, Currency Crisis and Growth 
This paper examines the effect of banking and currency crises on long-run growth. 
Our data cover 130 economies from 1800 to 2010, some dating from 1800 with the rest 
beginning in later years. The data include banking crises, currency crises, output per 
worker, growth rate of population and regional dummies. 
We found that both the frequency of banking crises and the frequency of currency 
crises have a negative and statistically significant effect on growth in the short run and a 
positive effect on growth, though statistically insignificant, in the longer run. While the 
frequency of currency crisis has a more negative impact on growth in the short to medium 
run (10 decades) than does the frequency of banking crisis, the effects of both become 
insignificantly positive in the longer run.  
More specifically, we show that the frequency of banking crisis is statistically 
significantly correlated to growth for the time windows of 1 decade and 2 decades, this 
negative relationship becoming increasingly more statistically insignificant overall for time 
windows from 3 decades to 10 decades before finally becoming positive, though 
statistically insignificant, for the time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample. 
The frequency of currency crisis is statistically significantly negatively associated with 
growth overall for the time windows of 1 decade to 10 decades, before becoming 
insignificantly positive for time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample.  
2 
1. Introduction
Financial crisis, which has attracted people’s attention since the Great Depression, 
is one of the dominant economic features of our age, with one of the resulting questions 
becoming: How does financial crisis affect economic growth? This paper limits financial 
crisis to banking crisis and currency crisis only. To answer this question, we attempt to 
explore further the relationship between banking crises, currency crises and growth from 
short-run to long-run based on the existing literature. 
The first and perhaps the deepest impression about a financial crisis is its strong 
destructive power and contagious effect. Indeed, a large body of literature discusses the 
output loss caused by banking and currency crises, most exploring recessions and their 
subsequent recoveries after banking and currency crises, showing how disruptive these 
financial crises are and how long it takes for economies to recover. For example, Bordo et 
al. (2001) concluded that banking and currency crises were more frequent but less costly 
in the 1980s and 1990s based on data for 23 countries from the nineteenth century until 
today, and Claessens et al. (2012) show that recessions accompanied with episodes of 
financial disruption, notably house and equity price busts, tend to be longer and deeper, 
while recoveries combined with rapid growth in credit and house prices tend to be stronger. 
Bordo and Haubrich (2012) examine the strength of recoveries after banking crises, 
finding that deeper recessions associated with them are also associated with faster 
recoveries. Similar results were found by Dwyer et al. (2013), who concluded that cross-
country evidence is consistent with Zarnowitz’s Law, i.e., if there is a contraction in 
economic activity as measured by real GDP per capita after a banking crisis, a larger fall 
3 
is associated with recovery at a faster rate; however, they also found a substantial diversity 
in the effect of banking crises on real GDP per capita.  
More recently, Devereux and Dwyer (2016) examined the output costs associated 
with 150 banking crises using cross-country data after 1970, finding many banking crises 
do not lead to contractions and most do not lead to large contractions, a result that holds 
for both developed and developing economies. In addition, they found that output losses 
are positively related to prior economic conditions such as credit growth for developed 
economies. For low-income economies, they found that other factors such as having a stock 
market and deposit insurance are more important. 
Another stream of the literature addresses the relationship between banking crisis, 
currency crisis and growth, an area closer to the question posed earlier, with Milesi-Ferretti 
and Razin (2000) finding that growth tends to decline in the year when the crisis occurred 
and to recover thereafter; in addition, countries more open to trade tend to grow faster after 
currency crises. Barro (2001) conducted a panel analysis of 67 industrialized and emerging 
countries, finding that a twin crisis typically reduces economic growth over a five-year 
period by 2% per year. In addition, he found that the financial crises had no persistent 
effects on growth beyond a five-year period. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who examined 
the fifteen worst financial crises of the second half of 20th century, found that 10 years 
after these crises, the median level of GDP per capita was still 15 percent below the trend 
level prior to crisis, although GDP was unaffected once enough time passed.   
Hong and Tornell (2005) investigated data from 100 developing countries, finding 
that even if the growth rate of GDP recovered to its pre-trend level two to three years after 
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a recession resulting from a currency crisis, it falls permanently below the original growth 
path that it would have achieved without the crisis. Gupta et al.’s (2007) study of 195 
episodes of currency crises in developing countries from 1970 to 2000 found that 
approximately 60% of them were accompanied by output contraction, while the rest were 
accompanied by output expansion. They concluded that crises are 1.5 times more likely to 
be contractionary in emerging markets than in developing economies. Cecchetti et al. (2009) 
used 40 systemic crises with information on the policies implemented found in Laeven and 
Valencia (2008), complementing the data for these 40 crises with more detailed 
information on initial conditions and outcomes. They found most systemic banking crises 
led to a decrease in growth, taking the economies several years to recover to their prior 
peak level. Bordo et al. (2010) investigated the impact of foreign currency debt on currency 
and debt crises and their indirect effects on short-term growth and long-term output based 
on data from 45 countries from 1880-1913 and 1973-2003, finding that the financial crisis 
driven by foreign currency exposure led to significant permanent output losses, and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2015) investigated 66 countries over an extensive period, finding that 
crises are typically associated with lower medium-term (five to ten years) growth.  
This research introduced above provides evidence for a negative impact of banking 
and currency crises on economic growth. Based on their earlier work (Rancière et al, 2006), 
Rancière et al. (2008), found results contradicting these studies that long-run growth (from 
10 to 40 years) and banking crises are positively related. They showed that over the last 
four decades, countries that have experienced financial crises have, on average, grown 
faster than countries with stable financial conditions. To explain this finding, they present 
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a model in which contract enforceability problems generate borrowing constraints and 
impede growth. The key of to this mechanism is that government bailout guarantees 
encouraged individuals to take more risks than would otherwise be the case, and this 
behavior  increases investment rate, further enhancing growth although this strategy incurs 
systemic crisis occasionally, a well-known moral hazard combined with institutional 
factors and policies at work. Similarly, Houston et al. (2010) also found a higher likelihood 
of financial crisis could be associated positively with higher growth by initiating stronger 
creditor rights to encourage both risk-taking and enhanced growth. Jarrow (2014) proposed 
a model to explain this bilateral relationship between financial development and economic 
growth.  
Contrasting findings give us different perspectives, the overall reasoning being that 
if the prosperity of the financial industry inherently contributes to economic growth, there 
must exist some underlying risk factors accompanying the development of this industry. A 
financial crisis will break out at some point when that these risks evolve out of control. 
Therefore, the development of financial markets is a two-edged sword. In this sense, the 
negative short-run correlation between financial crisis and growth may be positive or 
negligible in the long run. 
Consider an extreme case such as North Korea, which has a repressed financial 
system run by the government. There is no possibility of a financial crisis in North Korea 
even if the country experiences a lack of economic growth. Beyond that extreme, though, 
the countries with stable financial conditions (a safe path) might not grow faster than the 
countries with risk-taking tendencies (a risky path).  
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There is another possible role that financial crisis plays, that is, reform catalyst. 
Government, institutions and even the public can learn lessons from financial crisis, this 
will increase institutional quality, which is beneficial to growth in the long run.  
If a country can learn from the financial crisis and subsequently takes institutional 
reform, then this country will possibly get stronger and make financial crisis less costly. In 
turn, this makes it utilize the positive effect of financial system on growth to the utmost 
extent, and then financial crisis might actually regenerate a vibrant economy. The literature 
introduced above, which is not extensive, finds mixed results on the effect of crises on an 
economic growth in the long run. Theoretically, either relationship is possible. Then it is 
just the mixed evidence in the literature trigger us to examine the relationship between 
banking, currency crises and long-term growth.  
Based on the existing literature, we construct a broader dataset covering 130 
countries from 1800 to 2010, a period much longer than that found in most of the literature. 
Our data on banking crises and currency crises combine 4 sources, i.e., Bordo et al. (2001), 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013), and our data of the output 
per worker and population growth come from Tamura et al. (2016).  
Some countries in our consolidated dataset cover the entire period from 1800 to 
2010, with the remainder encompassing later time spans as explained in detail in Section 
Two. As our results show, the frequency of banking crises is significantly negatively 
associated with growth for time windows of one and 2 decades, a negative relationship that 
becomes increasingly more insignificant overall for time windows from three to 10 decades, 
and finally becoming a positive though insignificant for longer time window of 13, 16, and 
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19 decades. While the frequency of a currency crisis is significantly negatively associated 
with growth overall for time windows from one to 10 decades, it becomes insignificantly 
positive for time windows of 13, 16, and 19 decades. In the short to medium run, the 
frequency of currency crisis is more negatively related to growth than the frequency of 
banking crisis.  These results are more comprehensive than those found in previous works, 
for they incorporate short-term, medium-term and long-term analyses, thereby actually 
capturing the evolution of the relationship between banking crises, currency crises and 
economic growth. 
This paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 introduces the definitions of banking 
crisis and currency crisis, providing an historical review of the theories associated with 
them. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, and Sections 4 offers conclusions and 
implications of this work. 
2. Definitions and Duration of Banking Crises and Currency Crises
2.1. Definitions of Banking Crisis 
The fact that definitions and dating of banking crises differ across studies has been 
discussed in previous work before (see Frydl, 1999; Boyd et al. 2009; Babecký et al., 2012). 
Table 1.1 gives the definitions for dating the various types of crises for the three sources 
of our dataset: Bordo et al. (BEKM); Laeven and Valencia (LV); Reinhart and Rogoff (RR). 
As this table shows, these vary across these three datasets. In particular, for banking crises, 
researchers disagree about how many banks must be closed or what percentage of the 
financial system’s capital must be impaired for a crisis to be classified as systemic.  
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Table 1.1. Definitions of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis 
Authors Sample Banking Crisis Definition Currency Crisis Definition 
Bordo et 
al(2001) 
1880-1939 
21 Advanced 
Countries 
1945-1997 
21 Advanced 
Countries + 
34 Less 
Developed 
Countries and 
Emerging Market 
Economies 
Financial distress resulting in the erosion 
of most or all of aggregate banking system 
capital as in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) 
Forced change in parity, abandonment of a 
pegged exchange rate, or an international 
rescue. 
OR: an exchange market pressure (EMP) 
above a critical threshold (calculated as a 
weighted average of exchange rate change, 
short-term interest rate change, and reserve 
change relative to the same for the center 
country, the UK before 1913 and the US after). 
A currency crisis is said to occur when this 
index exceeds a critical threshold. We score an 
episode as a currency crisis when it shows up 
according to either or both of these indicators 
Reinhart 
and Rogoff 
(2009) 
1800-2011 
70 Countries 
A banking crisis occurs when there are one 
of two types of events:  
(1) bank runs that lead to the closure,
merging, or takeover by the public sector 
of one or more financial institutions;  
OR  
(2) if there are no runs, the closure,
merging, takeover, or large-scale 
government assistance of an important 
financial institution (or group of 
institutions), that marks the start of a string 
of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions. 
Reinhart and Rogoff(2009) An annual 
depreciation versus the US dollar (or the 
relevant reserve currency currency—
historically the UK pound, the French franc, or 
the German DM and presently the euro) of 15 
percent or more. 
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Laeven 
and 
Valencia 
(2012) 
1970-2011 
162 Countries 
Two conditions 
1. 
 Significant signs of financial distress in 
the banking system (as indicated by 
significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and/or bank liquidations) 
2. Significant banking policy intervention
measures in response to significant losses 
in the banking system. 
Nominal depreciation of the currency against 
the dollar of at least 30% that is also 10 
percentage points higher than the rate of 
depreciation in the year before. 
The dating of banking crises has traditionally relied primarily on the identification 
of “events” or subjective criteria to determine when one occurs (for example, Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996; Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera, 2005; and Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). While the advantage of such an approach is its flexiblility, the disadvantage 
is that it may be seen as arbitrary. The definition of banking crisis provided by Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) is more clear and easy to quantify, hence, less subject to such criticism.  
To compare the accuracy of various databases of banking crises, Chaudron et al. 
(2014) have compiled data to reconstruct the most important aspects of a systemic banking 
crisis based on their definition that a significant number or proportion of the banks must 
fail and/or that a significant proportion of the banking’s sector equity must have faced 
losses. Using these data, Chaudron et al. (2014) compared the dating of banking crises for 
the three leading databases (Caprio et al, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Laeven and 
Valencia, 2013) for the four crises with the most different time periods across these 
databases– the United States savings and loan crisis during the 1980s, the Japanese banking 
crisis of the 1990s, Norway’s banking crisis during the early 1990s and Turkey’s crisis 
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around the turn of the century. Their evidence suggests the database of banking crises 
compiled by Laeven and Valencia is the most accurate. The standard adopted by Charudron 
et al. (2014) does not take into account the possible interventions of the government that 
could reduce bank failures while both RR’s and LV’s definitions of a banking crisis 
consider large-scale of government intervention, meaning the latter would consider an 
event not accompanied with substantial capital loss due to the intervention by government 
as a banking crisis while Charudron et al.(2014) would not.  
Unsatisfied with the prevalent definitions of banking crisis, Von Hagen and Ho 
(2007) propose an index based on money market pressure to identify banking crises for 47 
countries from 1980 to 2001. They measure the money market pressure by the change in 
the short-term interest rate divided by its standard deviation plus the change in the volume 
of central bank reserves divided by its standard deviation. Based on Von Hagen and Ho 
(2007), Jing, Zhongbo, et al (2015) modify the market pressure index and identify banking 
crises for 109 countries from 1970 to 2009. Boyd et al. (2009) developed systemic bank 
shock indicators based on a theoretical model.  
2.2. Definitions of Currency Crisis 
Currency crisis is a situation in which a country with a fixed or pegged exchange 
rate faces a financial situation such as a deterioration of economic fundamentals or a 
speculative attack on the foreign exchange market, resulting in it needing to move to a 
floating exchange rate regime. Since the exchange rate determined by market is much 
higher than pegged level, the central bank of the country does not have sufficient foreign 
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exchange reserves to maintain the pegged fixed exchange rate, subsequently leading to a 
chronic balance of payments deficit and finally, the currency depreciating dramatically. 
This currency crisis is also referred to as a balance of payments crisis. 
The definitions of currency crisis are not as different as the definitions of banking 
crisis, for it is much easier to quantify by the change in the exchange rate. A currency crisis 
is usually identified by a threshold decline (e.g., 15% or 30%) in the nominal exchange 
rate. Both Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) adopt the definition 
proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996). 
2.3. History and theory overview of banking crises 
Banking crises have been around for a long history, were referred to as bank panics 
or liquidity crises before the appearance of deposit insurance or other forms of government 
guarantees and the creation of the lender of last resort (see Bordo et al., 2016). During a 
bank panic many depositors rush to convert their deposits into cash almost simultaneously, 
leading to bank failure since these institutions do not have enough reserves to meet the 
demand. Bank panics were typical in the nineteenth century for the developed countries 
where the central bank functioned as the lender of last resort. After WWII, with the 
widespread adoption of deposit insurance and the intervention by the lender of last resort, 
banking panics become rare.  Instead, now banking issues largely involve the insolvency 
of significant parts of the banking system, referred to as banking crises. 
According to Bordo et al. (2016), there are three traditional approaches for 
theorizing about banking crises: the monetarist approach; the financial fragility approach 
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and the business cycles approach, with the contemporary literature based on rational 
expectations and game theory being based on these. The first approach, the monetarist 
approach developed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), identifies financial crises with 
banking panics. According to them, banking panics occur because the public loses 
confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency. This loss of confidence 
is typically associated with the failure of important financial institutions as happened in 
1873, 1893, and 1907. 
The business cycles approach views banking panics as more likely during a 
recession because the returns on bank assets are likely to fall as borrowers become less 
likely to repay their loans (Mitchell, 1941). Depositors anticipating an increase in non-
performing loans try to protect their wealth by withdrawing their deposits, precipitating a 
bank run (Allen and Gale, 2007). 
Government guarantees created a direct link between the banking system and the 
government’s balance sheet. Once this precedent was set, a costly bailout had the potential 
to create significant fiscal imbalance and even lead to default. Moreover, guarantees could 
also lead to moral hazard problems. 
The third approach, the financial fragility approach, regards financial crises as an 
essential part of the upper turning point of the business cycle and as a necessary 
consequence of the excesses of the previous boom. Its well-known twentieth century 
proponents are Hyman Minsky (1977) and Henry Kaufman (1986). This approach has seen 
increased interest since the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
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2.4. History and theory overview of currency crises 
Advanced countries under the pre-1914 gold standard generally avoided currency 
crises, speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate reflecting an inconsistency between 
domestic fundamentals and the peg; however, they became a larger concern in the interwar 
and under the Bretton Woods system (Bordo et. al., 2001). Many currency crises, for 
example those in the early 1970s during the breakdown of the Bretton Woods global system, 
were due to the conflict between the goal of maintaining a fixed exchange-rate regime with 
other policy goals. 
In the first-generation model of currency crises, Krugman  (1979) argued that the 
conflict of domestic fiscal and monetary fundamentals with the pegging exchange rate 
would incur speculative attacks. The second-generation models (Obstfeld, 1995) suggest 
that self-fulfilling prophecies potentially occur:  if investors expect other investors to attack 
the currency, then they attack the currency rationally. The Asian crisis led to the creation 
of third- generation speculative attack models.  Both the financial institutions and the 
exchange-rate regimes collapsed in this crisis, indicating the links between governments 
and financial institutions can expose the system to further fragility. The third-generation 
models explore how problems in the banking and financial system interact with currency 
crises and how these crises impact the rest of the economy (McKinnon & Pill (1996), 
Krugman (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, & Roubini (1998), Radelet & Sachs (1998), Chang and 
Velasco (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001 and 2004), Krugman(1999)).  
2.5. Relationship between banking crisis and currency crisis 
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According to Bordo and Meissner (2015), during the post-World War II period and 
especially since the 1970s, banking, currency, and debt crises have become closely linked 
because governments realized the disastrous consequence of banking panics, becoming 
more willing to guarantee significant percentages of the liabilities of the banking system; 
because of this decision, banking panics have evolved into sovereign debt crises. 
Frequently, currency crises have occurred simultaneously with banking crises, a situation 
referred to as twin crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Glick and Hutchison (2000) 
found that these twin crises occurred frequently in financially liberalized emerging markets, 
with banking crisis frequently preceding the currency crisis in emerging markets but the 
converse not holding true. 
Causality between these two can begin with either the crisis:  a banking crisis can 
lead to capital flight and consequently currency devaluation, while a  currency crisis can, 
in turn, lead to insolvency for banks holding a large number of foreign currency 
denominated liabilities and domestic currency denominated assets. In addition,  there may 
be joint causality, i. e., some underlying common factors that cause the twin crisis, meaning 
there might not be a causality relationship between banking and currency crises (see Chang 
and Velasco (1999), McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ). 
 
2.6. Duration of banking crises and currency crises 
While the researchers listed in Table 1.1 define duration as the time it takes for an 
economy to recover from the downturn after financial crises, they differ in the standards 
used to measure the recovery. Even though it is more accurately phrases as “duration of 
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recession after crisis,” for simplicity, we will refer to it as the “duration of crisis.”  Below 
are the definitions for duration of crisis for these three researchers:   
• According to Bordo et al. (2001, p. 55), “To quantify the depth and duration of
crises, we calculate the trend rate of growth of GDP for five years preceding the
event. Recovery time, that is, crisis duration, is calculated as the number of years
before GDP growth returns to the trend.”
• According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2014, pp. 51) “duration measure is the number
of years it takes to reach the prior peak in real per capita income.”
• And Leaven and Valencia (2013, pp. 245) define it as “the end of a crisis as the
year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least
two consecutive years. In case the first two years record growth in real GDP and
real credit, the crisis end date equals the starting date of the crisis. In computing
end dates, we use bank credit to the private sector (in national currency) from IFS
(line 22d). . . .  We truncate the duration of crises at five years, starting with the
first crisis year. . . We also report the duration of the crisis, computed as the
difference between the end and start years of the crisis, measured in years.”
As all three definitions of the duration of a crisis is measured in years, for this
research, the minimum duration of a crisis is required to be at least one year. The duration 
of all banking crises and currency crises in our sample are shown in detail in Table A1 in 
Appendix.  
3. Data description
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We use three data sources from the banking crises and currency crises listed in 
Table 1.1, i.e., from Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and 
Valencia (2013), and one source of output per worker and growth rate of population from 
Tamura et al. (2016). We combined these datasets of financial crisis following the 
procedure of Dwyer et al. (2013), using the dataset from Bordo et al.(2001) before 1970 
and Laeven and Valencia (2013) for 1970 on, and then Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) when 
these two datasets are not available.  More specifically, Bordo et al. (2001) provide data 
for a 21-country sample from 1880 to1939 and 21 advanced countries plus 34 less 
developed countries and emerging markets. The crises dataset from Laeven and Valencia 
(2013) covers 161 countries from 1970 to 2011 during which they identify 147 banking 
crises. The variables we used are listed in Table 1.2.  
The communistic countries during this time period adopted a planned economy 
regime, which did not have a banking system nor did it experience financial crises. In 
addition, these countries adopted a Material Product Balance System (MPS), while 
capitalist countries adopted the System of National Accounts (NAS), the former is based 
on a planned economy while the latter is based on a market economy. Most of the 
communist countries switched to market-oriented countries after the dissolution of Soviet 
Union in 1991. While the data of the countries ever adopted communist regime are poorly 
estimated even decades after their transition. Given these differences, the data are not 
comparable between these two economies for our sample. In addition, our dataset is divided 
into 1 decade, 2 decades, …, 10 decades, while there are only 2 decades from 1990s to 
2010, which is not long enough to cover the length of time windows longer than 3 decades. 
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Henceforth we just delete the data of the countries ever adopted communist regime. 
As a result, we deleted the data from the countries under a communist regime, 
meaning our combined dataset included 130 countries from 1800 to 2010. The initial years 
in our sample differ across countries, focusing on 1800, 1820 and 1970 with all end dates 
being the year 2010. Figure 1.1 shows the beginning years of the different countries in the 
sample.  
Figure 1.1 shows the beginning years of different countries in the sample. 
Figure 1.1 Beginning Years of Different Countries 
Figure 1.2 shows the number of countries in the each beginning year for our sample. 
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Figure 1.2. Number of Countries in Beginning Years 
Table 1.2. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
Variable Definition and construction Source 
Output per Worker Output per worker in 2000 constant US$ Tamura  et al.(2016) 
Growth Rate of 
Output per Worker 
Log difference of Output per worker Tamura  et al.(2016) 
Growth Rate of 
Population 
Log difference of Population Tamura  et al.(2016) 
Frequency of Banking 
Crises 
The number of banking crises a country 
experienced during a given period 
Bordo et al.(2001), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011), Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
Frequency of 
Currency Crises 
The number of currency crises a country 
experienced during a given period 
Bordo et al.(2001), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011), Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
Region Dummy 
Western Countries: 1 
Southern Europe:  2 
Central and Eastern Europe: 3 
Newly Industrialized Countries: 4 
Tamura  et al.(2016) 
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It should be noted that as will be shown in Section 3, the dataset is divided into 
decadal intervals, which are of multiple decades, the value in end years of each decade, 
1800, 1810, …, 2010 are used for calculating the average annual growth rate of output per 
worker and population , while the frequency of data provided by Tamura et al. (2016) is 
only approximately but not exactly decadal.  The missing data from Tamura et al. (2016) 
in the end years of each decade 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830... 2000 and 2010 were interpolated.  
After comparing various methods, we chose the geometrically interpolation method in 
which the values for the missing years are interpolated by adjacent available values. One 
limitation of this method is that the value in the interpolated year may be substantially 
different from the surrounding values for such reasons as financial crises, political crises 
or natural disasters. This issue, however, will be addressed in the long-run analysis. 
The regional dummy variable comes from Tamura et al. (2016), who followed the 
convention of Lucas (1988) in region composition, with the only exceptions being the 
placement of Israel and Turkey in the Southern Europe region.   
Table 1.3. Summary Statistics 1 
Statistics Formula Value 
Asia: 5 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 6 
Latin America:  7 
Middle East:  8 
North Africa: 9 
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Total Number of Banking Crises 𝑇𝐵 = 𝑇𝐵$%$&'  248 
Total Number of Currency Crises 𝑇𝐵 = 𝑇𝐶$%$&'  458 
Average Number of Banking Crises per Country per Year 𝐴𝐵 = 𝑇𝐵$𝑇$%$&' 𝑁 0.0153 
Average Number of Currency Crises per Country per Year 𝐴𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶$𝑇$%$&' 𝑁 0.0284 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Output Per Worker 𝐴𝐺_𝑌 = 𝐺_𝑌$𝑇$%$&' 𝑁 0.0136 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Population 𝐴𝐺_𝑃 = 𝐺_𝑃$𝑇$%$&' 𝑁 0.0168 
Note: 𝑇𝐵$, Total number of banking crises for country 𝑖 over its sample period. 	  𝑇𝐵, Total number of banking crises over our sample. 
          𝑇𝐶$, Total number of currency crises for country 𝑖 over its sample period. 	  𝑇𝐶, Total number of currency crises over our sample. 
          𝐴𝐺_𝑌, Average annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample. 
          𝐴𝐺_𝑃, Average annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample. 	  𝐺_𝑌$, Average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 over its sample period. 
          𝐺_𝑃$, Average annual growth rate of population for country 𝑖 over its sample period. 
          𝑇$, The length of sample period of country 𝑖. 
Table 1.3 shows that the total number of banking crises is 248 and the total number 
of currency crises is 458 in our sample, the average number of banking crises per country 
per year is 0.015, and the average number of banking crises per country per year is 0.028. 
These two average values could be taken as the probability of the occurrence of banking 
crisis or currency crisis for a country in any given year for our sample. Moreover, average 
21 
annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample is 0.014 and average annual 
growth rate of population over our sample is 0.017. 
Table 1.4. Summary Statistics 2 
Statistics Mean Median Min Max Std Deviation 
Duration of Banking Crises 2.3 1 1 11 1.7 
Duration of Currency Crises 1.2 1 1 8 0.6 
Duration between Banking Crises 26.7 13.5 2 152 28.8 
Duration between Currency Crises 13.4 9 2 100 14.4 
Based on the definitions of duration of banking crisis and currency crisis introduced 
in sub-section 2.6, Table 1.4 shows the summary statistics of the duration of banking crises, 
the duration of currency crises, the duration between banking crises and the duration 
between currency crises, shown  in Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1.3. Histogram of the Duration of Banking Crises 
More specifically, Figure 1.3 shows the histogram of the duration banking crises in 
our sample. We can see the minimum duration of a banking crisis is one year, as defined 
in Section 2.7, while the longest banking crisis lasts 11 years; the average duration of a 
banking crisis is 2.3 years, the median of which is 1 year, meaning that more than half of 
the banking crises last no more than 1 year. Of the 248 banking crises total in our sample, 
128 last for 1 year, 29 for 2 years, 36 for 3 years, 20 for four years and 31 for 5 years.  
Figure 1.4 below shows the histogram of currency banking crises in our sample. 
Figure 1.4. Histogram of the Duration of Currency Crises 
We can see the minimum duration of currency crises is 1 year as defined in Section 
2.7, with the longest currency crisis lasting 6 years; the average duration of the currency 
crises is 1.2 years, with a median of 1 year, meaning that more than half of currency crises 
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last no more than 1 year. Of the  458 total currency crises in our sample,  391 last for 1 
year, 47  for 2 years, 14 for  3 years, 2 for 4 years, 1 for 5 years, and 3 for 6 years.  
Figure 1.5 below shows the histogram of duration between banking crises in our 
sample. 
Figure 1.5. Histogram of Duration Between Banking Crises 
We can see from this histogram that the shortest duration between banking crises 
is only 2 years, while the longest is 152 years, meaning that for 152 years, no banking crisis 
as defined in Section 2 occurred. The average duration between banking crises is 26.7 years, 
with a median of 13.5 years.  
Figure 1.6 below shows the histogram between currency crises in our sample. 
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Figure 1.6. Histogram of Duration Between Currency Crises 
We can see from this histogram that the shortest duration between currency crises 
is only 2 years, while the longest duration lasts 100 years, meaning that for a period of 100 
years, no currency crisis as defined in Section 2 occurred. The average duration between 
currency crises is 13.4 years, with a median of 9 years. 
Figure 1.7 below shows the number and percentage of countries experiencing 
banking and currency crisis from 1800 to 2010. 
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PANEL A 
PANEL B 
Figure 1.7. Number and Percentage of Countries Experiencing Banking and Currency Crisis from 1800 to 2010 
This figure consists of two panels. Panel A shows the number of countries in 
financial crisis from 1800 to 2010, with the blue line representing the number experiencing 
a banking crisis during that period and the orange line, the number experiencing a currency 
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crisis. Similar to the curve in figure 1.2, the green curve represents the total number of 
countries included in our sample from 1800 to 2010.  
Panel B shows the percentage of countries experiencing crises from 1800 to 2010, 
with the red line representing the percentage experiencing banking crises during that period 
and the green line the percentage experiencing a currency crisis. We can see clearly from 
PANEL B that, banking crises occurred highly simultaneously with currency crises. The 
percentage of countries experiencing currency crisis peaks significantly in 1815 at 0.35, 
1914 at 0.27, 1931 at 0.34 and 1949 at 0.24. Overall, the percentage of countries 
experiencing banking crisis is lower than that of countries experiencing currency crisis 
from during 1800-2010 period, with only one peak exceeds 0.20 in 1931, and three peaks 
exceeds 0.15 in 1814, 1915, and 1993-1995.  
Figure 1.8 shows the log of output per worker from 1800 to 2010. 
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Figure 1.8. Log of Output per Worker for the Initial Years of Each Decade from 1800 to 2010 
This figure clearly shows that the output per worker grew slowly but steadily during 
this period. The range of the log of output per worker increases over the years, with some 
being scattered far from the majority beginning in 1950.  Part of the reason for this trend 
is that the number of countries increases from 66 in 1950 to 121 in 1950 as is shown in 
Figure 1.1. While most of the countries included after 1950 are low and middle-income 
countries, some of these economies expanded after 1950, and the gap between rich 
countries and poor countries became increasingly larger.  
Figure 1.9 depicts the average growth rate of population of the countries for each 
decade from 1800 to 2010. 
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Figure 1.9. Average Growth Rate of Population of Countries from 1800 to 2010 
As this figure shows, the growth rate of population remains very stable from 1800 
to 2010, and most of the countries in our sample have an average growth rate of population 
of 0 to 0.05. The positive outlier in decade of 1851-1860 is in New Zealand, which has 
average annual growth rate of population of 12.91% during the decade. And the especially 
low outlier in decade of 1911-1920 is in Austria, which has average annual growth rate of 
population of -11.46% during the decade. 
Figure 1.10 incorporates three parts into one graph, i.e., growth rate of output per 
worker per country for each decade, average number of banking crises and currency crises 
per country for each decade from 1800 to 2010.  
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Figure 1.10. Growth Rate of Output per Worker per Country for Each Decade, Average Number of 
Banking Crises and Currency Crises per Country for Each Decade (1800-2010)  
The average number of crises equals the number of crises divided by the number of 
countries in the sample for each sub-period. The data in the second panel and the third 
panel in Figure 1.10, which are similar to that in Panel B in Figure 1.7, show the average 
number of banking crises and currency crises per country from 1800 to 2010. As this figure 
shows, it is evident that often banking crises and currency crises occur simultaneously, 
both lines peaking in the 1811-1810 period, the 1931-1940 period and the 1991-2000 
period. At first glance, the growth rate of output per worker for each decade in a period of 
more than an average number of banking crises and currency crises tends to be lower than 
during other periods, indicating that these crises have an adverse impact on growth in the 
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short run, i. e. for about a decade. There are some apparent outliers in figure 1.10, i.e., 
experienced high annual growth rate of output per worker of 11.09% in decade of 1841-
1850, Venezuela experienced a high annual growth rate of output per worker of 10.53% in 
decade of 1921-1930, and Equatorial Guinea experienced a high annual growth rate of 
output per worker of 15.54% in decade of 1991-2000. The negative outlier is in Qatar, 
which has annual growth rate of output per worker of -15.96% in decade of 1981-1990. 
4. Estimation
In this section, we investigate the relationship between banking crises, currency 
crises and growth, showing that our results are robust to the inclusion of variables 
controlling for population growth, country effect, time effect and regional dummy variables. 
In situations when the presence of unobservable, country-specific characteristics might 
affect the dependent variable and might be correlated with the independent variables, fixed 
effects models are particularly suitable. Moreover, they are generally appropriate when the 
data come not from a random sample but instead are the universe of data available, as is 
the situation here (For a discussion, see Hsiao, 1986.). In addition, our dataset covers 211 
years, long enough to see the time effects on economic growth. Thus, we control for both 
country effect and time effect in the panel analysis. 
4.1 Baseline models 
Equation (4.1.1) below represents the baseline model for panel regressions: ∆𝑦$3 = 𝛽'𝐹𝐵$3 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐶$3 + 𝜇$ + 𝜃3 + 𝛾′𝑋$3 + 𝜀$3 (4.1.1) 
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∆𝑦$ = 𝛽> + 𝛽'𝐹𝐵$ + 𝛽7𝐹𝐶$ + 𝛾′𝑋$ + 𝜀$                                              (4.1.2) 
where ∆𝒚𝒊𝒕: is the average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 during 
period 𝑡(a specific time window), a value which equals the log difference of output per 
worker; 𝑭𝑩𝒊𝒕 is the frequency of banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises 
country 𝑖 experienced per decade during period 𝑡; 𝑭𝑪𝒊𝒕 is the frequency of Currency Crisis, 
i.e., the average number of currency crises country 𝑖 experienced per decade during period𝑡. While there are times when a banking or currency crisis spans across the adjacent two 
periods, if we count this banking crisis only in the first period, then its effect on growth in 
the second period is not controlled for. To address this situation, we prorate this bridging 
crisis over two periods. For example, a banking crisis begins  in period 𝑡 − 1 and ends in 
period 𝑡, with a duration of  𝐿 years;  𝐿' years of it fall in period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝐿 − 𝐿' years of 
it fall in period 𝑡 , then period 𝑡 − 1  has 𝐿' 𝐿  of a banking crisis, and period 𝑡  has (𝐿 − 𝐿') 𝐿 of a banking crisis, meaning the number of banking or currency crises can be 
a percentage.  The variable 	  𝜇$ represents the country dummy and 𝜃3 the period dummy. In 
addition, 𝑋$3 is the set of control variables: the log of output per worker in the initial year 
for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡 and the average growth rate of population for country 𝑖 during 
period 𝑡, and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the error term.  
The coefficient  𝛽' in the equation measures how much the average growth rate of 
output per worker changes if the average number of banking crises a country experienced 
per decade increases by one, and similarly, coefficient 𝛽7  measures by how much the 
average growth rate of output per worker changes if the average number of currency crises 
per decade increases by  one;  
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Equation (4.1.2) represents the baseline model for cross-sectional regressions, 
where ∆𝒚𝒊 is the average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 during the 
sample period, which equals the log difference of output per worker; 𝑭𝑩𝒊 represents the 
frequency of banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises country 𝑖 
experienced per decade during the sample period; 𝑭𝑪𝒊	   is the frequency of currency crisis, 
i.e., the average number of currency crises country 𝑖 experienced per decade during the
sample period; 𝑋$  represents the set of control variables for cross-sectional regressions, 
which includes the log of output per worker in the initial year of the sample period, the 
average growth rate of population during the sample period and regional dummies. 
4.2. Endogeneity concern 
In the absence of a theoretical growth model related to banking and currency crises 
that offers a clear explanation of these determinants, panel analysis offers the advantage of 
controlling for omitted (unobserved or mismeasured) variables. For example, the countries 
that experienced banking and currency crises might have other factors that boost their 
economy while those experiencing fewer such crises might not have, for example, a high 
real income level, a developed capital market, or a strong institution and legal system. The 
omission of such variables leads to an endogeneity problem. Because this research controls 
for county and time effects, panel analyses are appropriate as they allow for controlling for 
omitted variables without observing them.  
The potential endogeneity problem caused by the reverse causality between the 
average annual growth rate of output per worker and the number of banking and currency 
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crises requires the former to affect the latter, a situation that may occur over ten years but 
not over thirty or more years. Even if this reverse causality exists, it only leads the 
correlation between growth rate of output per worker and the number of financial crises 
toward negative direction, but our findings show that their relationship evolves from 
negative to be positive. Hence, take one step back, the potential reverse causality is not 
strong enough to dominate over the underlying positive relationship between long-term 
growth rate of output per worker and the number of financial crises, which is one of our 
most important findings in our research. 
Hence, there is supposed to be no serious concern about endogeneity problem in 
this research.  
4.3. Multicollinearity Test 
As mentioned in Section 2.5, the occurrence of banking crises and currency crises 
is often interconnected. Table 1.5 provides the correlation coefficients between their 
frequencies.  Based on the “rule of thumb” test suggested by Anderson et al. (1990), any 
correlation coefficient exceeding 0.7 indicates a potential problem. As seen in Table 1.5, 
there are fairly low correlation coefficients between the frequency of banking crises and 
the frequency of currency crises, with the largest being 0.564 for the time window of the 
16 decades from 1850 to 2010. Thus, there is no significant multicollinearity between the 
frequency of banking crises and the frequency of currency crises.  
Table 1.5. Correlation Coefficients Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of 
Currency Crisis for Various Time Windows 
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Time window Correlation Time window Correlation 
1 decade 0.286 9 decades 0.472 
2 decades 0.318 10 decades 0.474 
3 decades 0.394 13 decades(1820-1950) 0.565 
4 decades 0.376 13 decades(1880-2010) 0.537 
5 decades 0.431 16 decades(1820-1980) 0.535 
6 decades 0.516 16 decades(1850-2010) 0.564 
7 decades 0.519 19 decades(1820-2010) 0.524 
8 decades 0.481 
The report of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the four independent variables is 
shown in Table 1.6. None of the values in parenthesis is greater than 2.00, meaning there 
is no significant multicollinearity among the four independent variables.  
Table 1.6. Variance Inflation Factor 
Frequency of 
Banking Crisis 
Frequency of 
Currency Crisis 
Log of Initial  
Output per Worker 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate of 
Population 
1 decade 1.075 1.0180 1.060 1.006 
2 decades 1.082 1.093 1.054 1.027 
3 decades 1.142 1.095 1.045 1.017 
4 decades 1.080 1.048 1.024 1.026 
5 decades 1.111 1.067 1.022 1.023 
6 decades 1.191 1.153 1.028 1.020 
7 decades 1.243 1.235 1.024 1.092 
8 decades 1.210 1.163 1.081 1.075 
9 decades 1.216 1.165 1.189 1.074 
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10 decades 1.208 1.039 1.166 1.273 
13 decades(1820-1950) 1.467 1.204 1.299 1.056 
13 decades(1880-2010) 1.601 1.272 1.277 1.431 
16 decades(1820-1980) 1.432 1.152 1.293 1.111 
16 decades(1850-2010) 1.651 1.270 1.196 1.222 
19 decades(1820-2010) 1.550 1.172 1.336 1.178 
4.4 Estimation Results 
4.4.1. Panel regressions with fixed effects for both country and time 
This section provides the panel analysis with fixed effects for both country and time 
from the time window of 1 decade to 10 decades based on the baseline model in Equation 
(4.1.1). Table 1.7 shows the panel regressions for the time windows of 1 decade and 2 
decades, while Table 1.8 shows the panel regressions for time windows of 3 and 4 decades, 
Table 1.9 for time windows of 5 and 6 decades, Table 1.10 for time windows of 7 and 8 
decades and Table 1.11 for time windows of 9 and 10 decades.  
The variables in these panel regressions include the dependent variable of average 
annual growth rate of output per worker and the explanatory variables of  frequency of 
banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises per decade; frequency of currency 
crisis during each period, i.e., the average number of currency crises per decade; the log of 
the output per worker in the initial year of each period; the average growth rate of 
population during each period; and the country dummies and time dummies.  
Table 1.7.  Panel Analyses of 1 and 2 Decades Controlling for Country and Time Effects 
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Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window 1 decade 2 decades 
Frequency of Banking Crisis -0.0040 ***
(0.0014) 
-0.0042 ***
(0.0014) 
-0.0044 ***
(0.0014) 
-0.0032
(0.0024) 
-0.0035 *
(0.0022) 
-0.0037 *
(0.0021) 
Frequency of Currency Crisis -0.0030 **
(0.0013) 
-0.0037 ***
(0.0010) 
-0.0038 ***
(0.0013) 
-0.0024
(0.0019) 
-0.0038 **
(0.0016) 
-0.0041 **
(0.0021) 
Log of Initial Output per 
Worker 
-0.0155 ***
(0.0015) 
-0.0149 ***
(0.0019) 
-0.0187 ***
(0.0020) 
-0.0181 ***
(0.0020) 
Growth Rate of Population 0.2200 *** 
(0.0638) 
0.1648  ** 
(0.0726) 
Number of Countries 130 130 
Number of Periods 20 10 
Number of Observations 1516 726 
R-squared 0.0145 0.0837 0.0987 0.0089 0.1760 0.1873 
F statistics/ 
P value 
10.0415/ 
4.68e-05 
41.5093/ 
< 2.22e-16 
37.2854 / 
< 2.22e-16 
2.7354/ 
0.0657 
42.2316/ 
< 2.22e-16 
34.1589/ 
< 2.22e-16 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of the dummies of country and time are not reported 
We divide the sample period for the time window of 1 decade into the 21 periods 
of 1801-1810, 1811-1820, …, 2001-2010. Table 1.7 lists the six columns representing the 
six regressions, each panel including three regressions. The R-squared, F-statistics/ P value 
show the regression listed in the first column is outperformed by that listed in the second 
and the third column. In addition, we can see that the coefficients of each variable remains 
stable in terms of sign, magnitude and significance across the second column and the third 
column. So we mainly look at the third column contains four variables of the coefficient. 
For panel analysis of a time window of 1 decade, the coefficient on frequency of banking 
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crisis is -0.0044 significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the average number of 
banking crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per 
worker decreases by 0.44%. The coefficient on frequency of currency crisis is -0.0038 
significant at a level of 1%,  meaning that when the average number of currency crises 
increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases 
by 0.38%.  
We divide sample period for the time window of 2 decades into the 10 periods of 
1811-1830, 1831-1850, …, 1991-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. The coefficient on 
frequency of banking crisis is -0.0037, significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the 
average number of banking crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth 
rate of output per worker decreases by 0.37%. The coefficient on the frequency of currency 
crisis is -0.0041, significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the average number of 
currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per 
worker decreases by 0.41%.  
Table 1.8.  Panel Analyses of 3 and 4 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects  
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window 3 decades 4 decades 
Frequency of Banking Crisis 0.0013 
(0.0026) 
-0.0006
(0.0022) 
-0.0012
(0.0022) 
0.0019 
(0.0031) 
-0.0001
(0.0023) 
-0.0004
(0.0023) 
Frequency of Currency Crisis -0.0021
(0.0022) 
-0.0040 **
(0.0017) 
-0.0042 **
(0.0017) 
-0.0032
(0.0032) 
-0.0049 **
(0.0021) 
-0.0051 **
(0.0020) 
Log of Initial Output per Worker -0.0191 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0198 *** -0.0192 ***
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(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Growth rate of Population 0.1408 * 
(0.0807) 
0.0893 
(0.0787) 
Number of Countries 128 127 
Number of Periods 7 5 
Number of Observations 485 313 
R-squared 0.0039 0.2490 0.2571 0.0119 0.3276 0.3320 
F statistics/ 
P value 
0.6838/ 
0.50538 
38.4725/ 
< 2.22e-16 
30.0331/ 
< 2.22e-16 
1.0861/ 
0.33975 
29.0645/ 
2.3326e-15 
22.17/ 
7.2424e-15 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients on the dummies of country and time are not reported 
We divide the sample period for the time window of 3 decades into the 7 periods 
of 1801-1830, 1831-1860, …, 1981-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of 
this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is statistically significant 
at -0.0012, meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per 
decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker per decade decreases by 0.12%. 
The coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is -0.0042, significant at a level of 5%, 
meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the 
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.42%. 
We divide the sample period for the time window of 4 decade into the 5 periods of 
1811-1850, 1851-1891, …, 1971-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. The coefficient of 
frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and statistically insignificant, 
meaning that an  increase in the average number of banking crises does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output per worker for 
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the time window of 4 decades. The coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is -0.0051, 
significant at a level of 5%,  meaning that when the average number of currency crises 
increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker  decreases 
by 0.51%. 
Table 1.9.  Panel Analyses of 5 and 6 decades Controlling Country and Time Effects  
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window 5 decades 6 decades 
Frequency of Banking Crisis -0.0012
(0.0035) 
-0.0009
(0.003) 
-0.0011
(0.0026) 
0.0013  
(0.0035) 
-0.0008
(0.0019) 
-0.0005
(0.0019) 
Frequency of Currency 
Crisis 
-0.0032
(0.0036) 
-0.0044 **
(0.0022) 
-0.0039 **
(0.0022) 
-0.0030
(0.0034) 
-0.0038 *
(0.0022) 
-0.0036 *
(0.0021) 
Log of Initial Output per 
Worker 
-0.0202 ***
(0.0018) 
-0.0200 ***
(0.0018) 
-0.0187 ***
(0.0014) 
-0.0197 ***
(0.0016) 
Growth rate of Population 0.0350 
(0.1042) 
-0.0863
(0.0882) 
Number of Countries 123 121 
Number of Periods 4 3 
Number of Observations 248 229 
R-squared 0.0143 0.3942 0.3950 0.0088 0.5315 0.5359 
F statistics/ 
P value 
0.8676/ 
0.4226 
25.816/ 
6.2024e-13 
18.6196/ 
6.9124e-12 
0.4631/ 
0.63059 
38.9418/ 
< 2.22e-16 
24.7223/ 
1.5685e-12 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported 
We divide the sample period for the time window of 5 decades into the 4 periods 
of 1811-1860, 1861-1910, …, 1961-2010. For the same reason,  we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For this panel analysis, 
the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is statistically insignificant at -0.0011, 
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meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per decade, the 
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.11%. The coefficient of 
the frequency of currency crisis is -0.0039, significant at a level of 5%,  meaning that when 
the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual 
growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.39%.  
We divide the sample period for the time window of 6 decades into the 3 periods 
of 1831-1890, 1891-1950, and 1951-2010.  We mainly look at the third column contains 
which contains four variables of the coefficient. For this panel analysis, the coefficient of 
frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and statistically insignificant,  
meaning that an increase in the average number of banking crises does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output per worker for 
this time window. The coefficient of the frequency of currency crisis is -0.0036, significant 
at a level of 10%,  meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by 
one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.36%.  
Table 1.10.  Panel Analyses of 7 and 8 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects  
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window 7 decades 8 decades 
Frequency of Banking 
Crisis 
-0.0033
(0.0041) 
-0.0021
(0.0028) 
-0.0022
(0.0029) 
-0.0076
(0.0061) 
-0.0008
(0.0029) 
-0.0006
(0.0030) 
Frequency of Currency 
Crisis 
0.0007 
(0.0036) 
-0.0021
(0.0027) 
-0.0021
(0.0027) 
-0.0020
(0.0034) 
-0.0045 *
(0.0025) 
-0.0045 *
(0.0026) 
Log of Initial Output per 
Worker 
-0.0170 ***
(0.0020) 
-0.0169 ***
(0.0020) 
-0.0182 ***
(0.0025) 
-0.0187 ***
(0.0026) 
41 
Growth rate of 
Population 
0.0220 
(0.1209) 
-0.0336
(0.0785) 
Number of Countries 64 61 
Number of Periods 3 2 
Number of Observations 135 113 
R-squared 0.0064 0.4186 0.4191 0.0069 0.5013 0.5026 
F statistics/ 
P value 
0.2145/ 
0.8075 
15.8442/ 
7.2801e-08 
11.7215/ 
3.1578e-07 
0.1705/ 
0.84371 
16.0848/ 
2.2667e-07 
11.8735/ 
9.5479e-07 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported. 
We divide the sample period for the time window of 7 decades into the 3 periods 
of 1801-1870, 1871-1940, and 1941-2010. For the same reason,  we mainly look at the 
third column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For panel analysis 
of this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is insignificant at -
0.0022, meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per 
decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.22%. The 
coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is also -0.0021 and statistically insignificant, 
meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the 
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.21%.  
We divide the sample period for the time window of 8 decades into the 2 periods 
of 8 decades of 1851-1930 and 1931-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the 
third column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel 
analysis, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and 
statistically insignificant,  meaning that an increase in the average number of banking crises 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output 
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per worker for the time window of 8 decades. The coefficient of frequency of currency 
crisis is -0.0045,  significant at a level of 10%, meaning that when the average number of 
currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per 
worker decreases by 0.45%.  
Table 1.11.  Panel Analyses of 9 and 10 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects  
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window 9 decades 10 decades 
Frequency of 
Banking Crisis 
0.0050 
(0.0071) 
-0.0002
(0.0032) 
0.0001 
(0.0033) 
-0.0022
(0.0063) 
0.0015 
(0.0016) 
-0.0001
(0.0011) 
Frequency of 
Currency Crisis 
-0.0010
(0.0037) 
-0.0048 *
(0.0028) 
-0.0048 *
(0.0018) 
-0.0071
(0.0051) 
-0.0065 **
(0.0025) 
-0.0066 **
(0.0030) 
Log of initial 
Output per 
Worker 
-0.0146 ***
(0.0014) 
-0.0150 ***
(0.0020) 
-0.0168 ***
(0.0015) 
-0.0134 ***
(0.0018) 
Growth rate of 
Population 
-0.0240
(0.1029) 
0.2488 *** 
(0.0788) 
Number of 
Countries 
60 56 
Number of 
Periods 
2 2 
Number of 
Observations 
112 73 
R-squared 0.0107 0.5855 0.5859 0.1305 0.8195 0.8730 
F statistics/ 
P value 
0.2670/ 
0.76675 
22.5999/ 
2.8831e-09 
16.6268/ 
1.4812e-08 
1.0504/ 
0.3758 
19.6808/ 
4.0936e-05 
20.6203/ 
2.6185e-05 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported 
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We divide the sample period for the time window of 9 decades into the 2 periods 
of 10 decades of 1831-1920, 1921-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of 
this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to 
zero and statistically insignificant, meaning that an average increase in the number of 
banking crises does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth 
rate of output per worker for the time window of 9 decades. The coefficient of frequency 
of currency crisis is -0.0048,  significant at a level of 10%, meaning that when the average 
number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of 
output per worker decreases by 0.48%.  
We divide the sample period for the time window of 10 decades into the 2 periods 
of 10 decades of 1811-1910, 1911-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third 
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of 
this time window,  the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to 
zero and statistically insignificant, meaning that an increase in the  average number of 
banking crises  does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth 
rate of output per worker for time window of 10 decades. The coefficient of frequency of 
currency crisis is -0.0068, significant at a level of 5%, meaning that when the average 
number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of 
output per worker  decreases by 0.68%.  
4.4.2. Cross-sectional Regression 
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Since the longest time window for panel analyses is 10 decades, to investigate the 
relationship between banking crises, currency crises and growth in the long run, we extend 
the time windows by conducting cross-sectional regressions for time windows of 13 
decades, 16 decades and 19 decades. The variables in cross-sectional regressions include 
the dependent variable of average annual growth rate of output per worker and the 
explanatory variables of frequency of banking crisis, the average number of banking crises 
a country experienced during the sample period; frequency of currency crisis, the average 
number of currency crises a country experienced during the sample period; the log of initial 
output per worker, the log of the output per worker in the beginning of the year during the 
sample period; the average growth rate of population during the sample period; and the 
regional dummy introduced in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.12 presents cross-sectional regressions for the 2 time windows of 13 
decades based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2), with the first regression being 
from 1820 to 1950 and the second regression from 1880 to 2010.  
Table 1.12.  Crises and Growth: Cross-sectional Regressions for Time Window of 130 Years 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Explanatory Variables 1820-1950 (130 years) 1880-2010 (130 years) 
  Intercept 
0.0010 
(0.0147) 
0.0390 *** 
(0.0095) 
0.0370 ***  
(0.0094) 
0.0421 *** 
(0.0083) 
Frequency of Banking Crisis 
0.0072 ** 
(0.0032)  
0.0032 
(0.0023) 
0.0039 
(0.0043) 
0.0030 * 
(0.0021) 
Frequency of Currency Crisis 
0.0026 
(0.0030) 
-0.0015
(0.0032) 
-0.0020
(0.0029) 
0.0015  
(0.0022) 
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Log of Initial Output per Worker 
-0.0006
(0.0019) 
-0.0051 ***
(0.0012) 
-0.0024 *
(0.0011) 
-0.0039 ***
(0.0009) 
Growth Rate of Population 
0.2270 *** 
(0.0762) 
0.1715 *** 
(0.0442) 
0.0227 
(0.0690) 
Region: Western Countries 
0.0128 
(0.0016) 
0.0074 *** 
(0.0017) 
Region: Southern Europe 
0.0061  
(0.0015) 
0.0066 *** 
(0.0016) 
Region: Newly Industrialized Countries 
0.0044 
(0.0016) 
0.0128 *** 
(0.0018) 
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa 
0.0074 
(0.0013) 
-0.0014
(0.0026) 
Region: Latin America 
0.0097  
(0.0026) 
0.0016 
(0.0018) 
Region: Middle East 
0.0086 
(0.0018) 
0.00240 
(0.0026) 
Region: North Africa 
0.0049 
(0.0015) 
0.0017 
(0.0017) 
Number of countries 52 56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1822 0.7005 0.0240 0.6374 
F statistics/ 
P value 
3.841/ 
0.008818 
11.85/ 
2.029e-09 
1.337/ 
0.2688 
9.79/ 
1.232e-08 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-1950, the first column represents 
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the 
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0072 and that of the frequency of currency crisis 
is statistically insignificant 0.0026. The second column under regression of period 1820-
1950 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the 
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frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically 
insignificant are 0.0032 and -0.0015 respectively.  
Figure 1.11 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and 
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for cross-
sectional regression of period 1820-1950. Figure 1.12 and figure 1.13 plot the regression 
lines between frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth 
rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1820-1950 with 
regional dummies. 
Figure 1.11 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency 
Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross- sectional Regression of 1820-1950 
Without Regional Dummies. 
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Figure 1.12 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross- sectional Regression of Period 1820-1950 with Regional Dummies. 
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Figure 1.13 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross- sectional Regression of Period 1820-1950 With Regional Dummies. 
For the regression of period 1880-2010, the first column represents the regression 
without regional dummies, in which the coefficients of the frequency of the banking crisis 
and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically insignificant 0.0039 and -0.0020 
respectively. The second column represents the regression with regional dummies, in 
which the coefficient of the frequency of banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0030 
and the frequency of currency crisis is statistically insignificant -0.0015 respectively. 
Figure 1.14 plots regression lines between frequency of banking crisis and average 
growth rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 
with regional dummies. Figure 1.15 and figure 1.16 plot the regression lines between 
frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth rate of output 
per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 with regional dummies. 
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Figure 1.14 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and 
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1880-2010 Without 
Regional Dummies. 
Figure 1.15 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
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Figure 1.16 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
Table 1.13 presents the cross-sectional regressions for the 2 time windows of 16 
decades based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2), with the first regression being 
from 1820 to 1980 and the second from 1850 to 2010.  
Table 1.13.  Crises and Growth: Cross-Sectional Regressions for the Time Window of 160 Years 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
1820-1980 (160 years) 1850-2010 (160 years) 
  Intercept 
0.0139 
(0.0171)  
0.0342 *** 
(0.0088) 
0.0244 ** 
(0.0196) 
0.0342 *** 
(0.0088) 
51 
Frequency of 
Banking Crisis 
0.0084 * 
(0.0042)  
0.0022 
(0.0030) 
0.0037 
(0.0032) 
0.0022 
(0.0030) 
Frequency of 
Currency Crisis 
-0.0004
(0.0026) 
-0.0006
(0.0027) 
-0.0000
(0.0029) 
-0.0006
(0.0027) 
Log of Initial 
Output per 
Worker 
-0.0003
(0.0021) 
-0.0039 ***
(0.0011) 
-0.0012
(0.0014) 
-0.0039 ***
(0.0011) 
Growth Rate of 
Population 
0.1137 
(0.0780) 
0.0955 ** 
(0.0400) 
-0.0140
(0.0858) 
0.0955 ** 
(0.0400) 
Region: Western 
Countries 
0.0121 *** 
(0.0015) 
0.0121 *** 
(0.0015) 
Region: Southern 
Europe 
0.0098 *** 
(0.0020) 
0.0098 *** 
(0.0020) 
Region: Newly 
Industrialized 
Countries 
0.0093 *** 
(0.0017) 
0.0093 *** 
(0.0017) 
Region: Sub-
Saharan Africa 
0.0065 *** 
(0.0016) 
0.0065 *** 
(0.0016) 
Region: Latin 
America 
0.0086 *** 
(0.0020) 
0.0086 *** 
(0.0020) 
Region: Middle 
East 
0.0089 *** 
(0.0019) 
0.0089 *** 
(0.0019) 
Region: North 
Africa 
0.0055 *** 
(0.0017) 
0.0055  
(0.0017) 
Number of 
countries 
52 52 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.03747 0.6823 -0.04646 0.6613 
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F statistics/ 
P value 
1.496/ 
0.2185 
10.96/ 
6.106e-09 
0.4339/ 
0.7834 
10.05/ 
2.005e-08 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-1980, the first column represents 
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the 
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0084 and that of the frequency of currency crisis 
is statistically insignificant -0.0004. The second column under regression of period 1820-
1980 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the 
frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically 
insignificant are 0.0022 and -0.0006 respectively.  
Figure 1.17 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and 
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for cross-
sectional regression of period 1820-1980. Figure 1.18 and figure 1.19 plots the regression 
lines between frequency of banking crisis and average growth rate of output per worker of 
each region for cross-regression of period 1820-1980 with regional dummies.  
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Figure 1.17 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and 
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 Without 
Regional Dummies. 
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Figure 1.18 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 With Regional Dummies. 
Figure 1.19 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of 
Output Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 With Regional 
Dummies. 
For the regression of period 1880-2010, the first column represents the regression 
without regional dummies, in which the coefficients of the frequency of the banking crisis 
is statistically insignificant 0.0037 and that of the frequency of currency crisis is almost 
close to zero respectively. The second column represents the regression with regional 
dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of banking crisis is statistically 
significant 0.0022 and the frequency of currency crisis is statistically insignificant -0.0006 
respectively.  
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Figure 1.20 plots regression lines between frequency of banking crisis and average 
growth rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 
with regional dummies. Figure 1.21 and figure 1.22 plot the regression lines between 
frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth rate of output 
per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 with regional dummies. 
Figure 1.20 Regression line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and 
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1880-2010 without regional 
Dummies. 
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Figure 1.21 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
Figure 1.22 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
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Table 1.14 presents the cross-sectional regressions for the time windows of 16 
decades from 1820-1980 based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2). 
Table 1.14.  Crises and Growth: Cross-sectional Regressions for Time Window of 190 Years 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Explanatory Variables 1820-2010 (190 years) 
  Intercept 
0.0299 ** 
(0.0131) 
0.0345 *** 
(0.0082) 
Frequency of Banking Crisis 
0.0073 ** 
(0.0033) 
0.0021 
(0.0018) 
Frequency of Currency Crisis 
-0.0012
(0.0025) 
0.0014 
(0.0022) 
Log of Initial Output per Worker 
-0.0023
(0.0016) 
-0.0035 ***
(0.0010) 
Growth Rate of Population 
0.0381 
(0.0829) 
0.0720 * 
(0.0401) 
Region: Western Countries 
0.0074 *** 
(0.0011) 
Region: Southern Europe 
0.0056  
(0.0012) 
Region: Central and Eastern Europe 
Region: Newly Industrialized Countries 
0.0088 *** 
(0.0012) 
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa 
0.0017 
(0.0012) 
Region: Latin America 0.0022 
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(0.0014) 
Region: Middle East 
0.0025 
(0.0019) 
Region: North Africa 
0.0020 
(0.0013) 
Number of countries 52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0114 0.7008 
F statistics/ 
P value 
1.147/ 
0.346 
11.86/ 
1.999e-09 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-2010, the first column represents 
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the 
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0073 and that of the frequency of currency crisis 
is statistically insignificant -0.0012. The second column under regression of period 1820-
2010 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the 
frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically 
insignificant are 0.0021 and 0.0014 respectively.  
Figure 1.23 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and 
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for cross-
sectional regression of period 1820-2010. Figure 1.24 and figure 1.25 plot the regression 
lines between frequency of banking crisis and average growth rate of output per worker of 
each region for cross-regression of period 1820-2010 with regional dummies.  
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Figure 1.23 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency 
Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1820-2010 
Without Regional Dummies. 
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Figure 1.24 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
Figure 1.25 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output 
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-2010 With Regional Dummies. 
4.4.3. Estimation Summary 
Table 1.15 shows the summary of the coefficients of frequency of banking crisis 
and frequency of currency crisis for the regression with all of the four independent 
variables, i.e., frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis, log of initial GDP 
per capita and average growth rate of Population. The P values are reported in the 
parentheses below the estimates.  
Table 1.15. Summary of Coefficients of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis 
(P values are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
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Time 
window 
Model Coefficient on 
Frequency of 
Banking 
Crisis 
Coefficient on 
Frequency of 
Currency 
Crisis 
Number of 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
1 decade Panel -0.004 ***
(0.001) 
-0.004 ***
(0.001) 
130 1516 
2 decades Panel -0.004 *
(0.075) 
-0.004 **
(0.010) 
130 726 
3 decades Panel -0.001
(0.602) 
-0.004 **
(0.016) 
128 485 
4 decades Panel -0.000
(0.869) 
-0.005 **
(0.015) 
127 313 
5 decades Panel -0.001
(0.695) 
-0.004 ***
(0.045) 
123 248 
6 decades Panel -0.000
(0.813) 
-0.004 *
(0.097) 
121 229 
7 decades Panel -0.002
(0.452) 
-0.002
(0.439) 
64 135 
8 decades Panel -0.001
(0.852) 
-0.005 *
(0.087) 
64 113 
9 decades Panel 0.000 
(0.986) 
-0.005 *
(0.093) 
61 112 
10 
decades 
Panel -0.000
(0.957) 
-0.007 *
(0.014) 
56 73 
13 
decades 
Cross 
section 
0.003 
(0.116) 
-0.000
(0.573) 
52 for 1820-
1950 
52 for 1820-
1950 
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56 for 1880-
2010 
56 for 1880-
2010 
16 
decades 
Cross 
section 
0.002 
(0.394) 
0.001 
(0.544) 
52 for 1820-
1980 
52 for 1850-
2010 
52 for 1820-
1980 
52 for 1850-
2010 
19 
decades 
Cross 
section 
0.002 
(0.248) 
0.001 
(0.521) 
52 52 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
Note: 1) The coefficients and corresponding P value for cross sectional regressions of time windows of 13 
decades are average values over regressions of time windows 1820-1950 and 1880-2010.  
2) The coefficients and corresponding P value for cross sectional regressions of time windows of 16
decades are average values over regressions of time windows 1820-1880 and 1850-2010. 
Figure 1.26 shows graphically the tabular information in Table 1.15.  The one 
small difference between the two is that Table 1.15 rounds the coefficients to the fourth 
decimal place while Figure 1.26 rounds them to the seventh decimal place. 
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Figure 1.26.  Coefficients of Frequency of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis for Different Time Windows 
As this figure shows, we can see an obvious upward-sloping trend, with the blue 
line representing the coefficients of the frequency of banking crisis, and the purple line the 
coefficients of the frequency of currency crisis. The green dot represents the statistically 
significant coefficients of the frequency of banking crisis, while the red dot represents the 
significant coefficients of the frequency of currency crisis. It is clear that the coefficients 
of frequency of banking crisis remain significantly negative from time window of 1 decade 
to 2 decades, their negative effects gradually turning positive, while the coefficients of 
frequency of currency crisis have more significantly negative values overall, and both the 
coefficient of frequency of banking crisis and the coefficient of frequency of currency crisis 
turn positive as the time window increases to 13 decades.  
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Some of the coefficients of frequency of banking crisis and frequency of currency 
crisis are not statistically significant, but economically significant, since they are of great 
magnitude.  
Since financial risk-taking lies behind financial crisis, then the net effect of 
financial risk-taking remains significantly negative in the short run, changing to positive, 
though statistically insignificant, in the longer run. It is noteworthy that currency crises are 
more destructive than banking crises overall. In other words, since a currency crisis is the 
realization of potential risks that are more foreign-involved in a severe speculative attack, 
roughly speaking, the price for a country to take more financial risk to finance investment 
and further economic growth (risky path) is much higher when international dimensions of 
risks are involved than in circumstances without international dimensions of risks.  
5. Conclusion remarks
Financial development boosts economic growth while financial crises are typically 
associated with slower economic growth. As financial crises have been occurring more 
frequently, more research exploring the relationship between them and growth is being 
conducted.  Due to data availability, most of these studies focus on the short-run. However, 
it is not clear which one of the two effects dominate economic growth across countries in 
the long-run. 
In this paper, we use a multi-country dataset to address the relationship between the 
long-term nexus between banking crises, currency crises and growth. To broaden the 
current datasets, we combine the three leading datasets of financial crises from Bordo et 
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al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia(2013) and a dataset of 
output per worker and growth rate of population from Tamura et al. (2016). This composite 
dataset covers 130 economies from around the world, some from 1800 with the rest 
beginning in later years.  
Our panel analyses and cross-sectional analyses show that the coefficients of 
frequency of banking crisis remain significantly negative from time window of 1 decade 
to 2 decades, with its negative effect turning positive gradually, while the coefficients of 
frequency of currency crisis have more statistically significantly negative values overall, 
and both coefficient of frequency of banking crisis and coefficient of frequency of currency 
crisis turn positive when the time window increases to 13 decades.  
We find the effects of both the frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of 
currency crisis remain significantly negative in the short run, changing positive though 
statistically insignificant in the longer run. While the frequency of currency crisis has much 
more adverse effect on growth from short run to medium run (10 decades) than the 
frequency of banking, though both effects on growth become insignificantly positive in the 
longer run. In other words, the net effect of banking crisis on growth is relatively less 
destructive than the net effect of currency crisis in the short run, though both seem to boost 
growth in the long run (longer than 10 decades).  
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APPENDIX
Table A1. List of Banking crises and Currency crises from 1800 to 2010 for 153 countries 
Banking crises Currency crises 
Algeria 1990-1994 1988;1944 
Argentina 1890-1891 1885;1890;1908;1914;1929-
1932;1950;1959;1962;1967;1975;1980;1987;2002 
Australia 1828;1843;1893 1915;1932-1933;1949 
Austria 1873;1924;1929;1931;2008-2010 1800-1801;1804;1807;1813;1815-1817;1850-
1851;1853;1856;1859-
1960;1863;1866;1915;1918;1923;1933;1945-1850 
Bangladesh 1987 1976 
Belgium 1838-1839;1842;1848;1870-
1871;1914;1925-
1926;1931;1934;1939;2008-2010 
1914;1924;1935;1938;1949 
Bolivia 1986;1994 1932-1933;1936-
1937;1950;1953;1956;1958;1963;1973;1981 
Botswana 1984 
Brazil 1890-1891;1897;1900-
1901;1914;1923;1963;1990-1998 
1818-1816;1820-1821;1827-
1829;1837;1842;1868;1889;1898;1914;1930-
1931;1934;1937;1959;1962-
1963;1965;1976;1982;1987;1992;1999 
Burkina Faso 1990-1994 1994 
Burundi 1994-1998 
Cameroon 1987-1912;1995-197 1994 
Cape Verde 1993 
Canada 1837;1866;1923 1891;1893;1908;1914;1921;1929;1931;1950;1962 
Central African 
Rep 
1976;1995-1996 1943-1944;1959;1994 
Chad 1983;1992-1996 1994 
Chile 1889;1898;1907;1914;1925;1976;1981-1985 1887;1889;1898;1931;1953;1962;1968;1972;1982 
Colombia 1982;1998-2000 1906;1909;1920;1932;1951;1962;1965;1967;1985 
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Comoros 1994 
Congo, Rep 1992 1994 
Costa Rica 1987-1991;1994-1995 1920;1922;1933;1935;1981;1991 
Denmark 1813;1857;1885;1907;1914;1931;2008-2010 1914;1921-1922;1931-1932 
Djibouti 1991-1995 
Dominican Rep 2003-2004 1985;1990;2003 
Ecuador 1982-1986;1998-2002 1921-1922;1924;1931;1934-1935;1938;1982;1999 
Egypt 1907;1980 1949;1962;1979;1990 
El Salvador 1989 1986 
Equatorial Guinea 1983 1980;1994 
Eritrea 1993 
Estonia 1992-1994 1992 
Fiji 1998 
Finland 1990;1921;1931;1939;1991-1995 1914;1921;1931;1949;1993 
France 1802;1805;1882;1889;1907;1930-
1932;2008-2010 
1813-1814;1816;1888;1914;1923;1926;1936-
1937;1948;1957;1968 
Gabon 1994 
Gambia 1985;2003 
Germany 1857;1901;1931 1913-1815;1962-
1863;1872;1893;1907;1914;1931;1934;1949 
Ghana 1982-1983 1949;1967;1978;1983;1993;2000;2009 
Greece 1931;2008-2010 1885;1914;1931-1932;1950;1983 
Guatemala 1986 
Guinea 1985;1993 1982;2005 
Guinea-Bissau 1995-1998 1980;1994 
Guyana 1983 1987 
Haiti 1994-1998 1992;2003 
Honduras 1990 
Iceland 2008-2010 1932;1947;1950;1960;1975;1981;1989;2008 
India 1863;1866;1908;1913-1916;1921-
1922;1929-1931;1947-1948;1993 
1894;1920-1921;1950;1967 
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Indonesia 1997-2001 1948-1949;1952-1954;1957-1959;1962-1964;1966-
1968;1979;1998 
Iran 1985;1993;2000 
Ireland 1836;1856;2008-2010 1865;1919;1931;1939;1967 
Israel 1977 1975;1980;1985 
Italy 1866;1868;1891;1893;1907;1914;1921;1930-
1931;1935;2008-2010 
1894;1908;1935-1936;1964;1981 
Ivory coast 1988-1992 1943-1944;1994 
Jamaica 1996-1998 1978;1983;1991 
Japan 1901;1907;1917;1927;1997-2001 1864;1900;1904;1908;1917;1921;1931-1932 
Jordan 1989-1991 1989 
Kenya 1985;1992-1994 1993 
Kuwait 1982-1995 
Latvia 1995;2008-2010 1992 
Lebanon 1990-1993 1984;1990 
Lesotho 1985 
Liberia 1991-1994 
Lithuania 1995-1996 1992 
Luxembourg 2008-2010 
Madagascar 1988 1984;1994;2004 
Malawi 1994 
Malaysia 1997-1999 1902;1920;1948;1998 
Mali 1987-1991 1994 
Mauritania 1984 1993 
Mexico 1981-1985;1994-1996 1914;1931;1938;1948;1954;1977;1982;1995 
Morocco 1980-1984 1918;1921;1929-1931;1943-1944;1947;1949-1950;1958-
1959;1981 
Mozambique 1987-1991 1987 
Myanmar 1975;1990;1996;2001;2007 
Namibia 1984 
Nepal 1988 1984;1992 
Netherlands 1819-1929;1897;1914;1921;1939;2008-2010 1914;1914;1921;1923;1935;1949 
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New zealand 1890-1895 1967;1984 
Nicaragua 1990-1993;2000-2001 1903-1905;1907;1909;1911-1912;1937-
1939;1946;1979;1985;1990 
Niger 1983-1985 1994 
Nigeria 1991-1995;2009-2010 1950;1983;1989;1997 
Norway 1814;1921-1923;1931;1991-1993 1820-1821;1864;1914;1931;1949 
Pakistan 1972 
Panama 1988-1989 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1995 
Paraguay 1890;1995 1920;1930-1931;1933;1935-1936;1941;1943;1951;1954-
1956;1958;1984;1989;2002 
Peru 1872-1876;1983 1921;1930;1932;1938-
1939;1950;1953;1958;1968;1976;1981;1988 
Philippines 1983-1986;1997-2001 1962;1983;1998 
Portugal 1828;1846-
1847;1891;1920;1923;1931;2008-2010 
1801;1815;1891;1931;1983 
Rwanda 1991 
Senegal 1988-1991 1994 
Sierra Leone 1990-1994 1983;1989;1998 
Singapore 1892-1894;1901-1902;1920;1950 
Slovak Rep 1998-2002 
South Africa 1865-1869;1877;1881;1890-1892 1933;1940;1950;1967;1984 
South Korea 1997-1998 1946;1948-1952;1954-1955;1962-1963;1966;1998 
Spain 1814-1817;1829;1846-1847;1920;1924-
1925;1931;1977-1981;2008-2010 
1931;1958;1967;1983 
Sri Lanka 1989-1991 1920;1931;1939;1956;1968;1978 
Sudan 1981;1988;1993 
Suriname 1990;1995;2001 
Swaziland 1995-1999 1985 
Sweden 1811-1814;1897;1907;1931-1932;1991-
1935;2008-2010 
1815;1819;1914;1931-1932;1949;1993 
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Switzerland 1870;1931;1933;2008-2010 1964;1914;1936;1939 
Syria 1988 
Taiwan 1946;1950;1955 
Thailand 1983;1997-2000 1985;1990 
Tanzania 1987-1988 1862-1963;1883;1894;1922;1932;1942;1950;1954;1998 
Togo 1993-1994 1994 
Tunisia 1991 1944;1946;1949-1950;1958;1965 
Turkey 1931;1982-1984;2000-2001 1809-1810;1820;1822;1828-1829;1831;1862-1863;1920-
1921;1946;1957;1959;1978;1984;1991;1996;2001 
Turkmenistan 2008 
Uganda 1994 1980;1988 
United Kingdom 1810-1811;1815;1825;1837-1840;1847-
1850;1857;1866;1890;2007-2010 
1815;1914;1931;1947;1949;1961;1964-1968 
United States 1818-1819;1825;1836-
1839;1857;1884;1893;1907;1914;1930-
1933;2007-2010 
1814;1862;1876;1891-1892;1933;1960 
Uruguay 1893;1898;1981-1985;2002-2005 1919;1930-1931;1938-1939;1948-1949;1957-1958;1963-
1965;1967-1968;1972;1983;1990;2002 
Venezuela 1994-1998 1984;1989;1994;2002 
Zaire 1983;1991-1998 1976;1983;1989;1994;1999;2009 
Zambia 1995-1998 1950;1983;1989;1996;2009 
Zimbabwe 1995-1999 1983;1991;1998;2003 
Note: There are 248 banking crises and 458 currency crises in our sample. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OPENNESS AND GROWTH 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of capital account openness on growth using two 
measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and The Chinn-Ito 
Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had a positive effect on 5-year 
average growth, 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth based on panel 
analyses, but an insignificant even negative effect on growth in the long run based on cross-
sectional regressions. The results are robust to controlling country dummy and time dummy. 
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1. Introduction
The effect of capital account openness on economic growth has received 
considerable attention. As the proponents claim, capital account openness, in certain 
circumstances increases efficient allocation of international capital, while capital control 
incurs high administrative costs of imposing capital controls, capital control has possible 
prevention of adaptation to changing international circumstances, and necessary 
adjustments in policies in the context of financial globalization might be postponed.  
While the opponents claim that international capital flows tend to be highly 
sensitive to macroeconomic policies, to the soundness of the banking system and to 
economic and political developments. Inflows might be excessive which cause instability. 
On the other hand, capital controls are effective in reaching the intended goal; and controls 
may help to support a weak financial system, and controls on inflows seem to make 
monetary policy more independent.  
The evidence of the effect of capital account openness on growth is not so clear. 
Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) find no association between the levels of capital 
account openness and growth for advanced industrial nations. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1995) find no effects of capital account openness on growth in emerging market nations. 
The most widely cited study of the correlation of capital account liberalization with growth 
is Rodrik (1998), which finds no correlation between capital account liberalization and 
growth, based on a sample of 100 industrial and developing countries for the period 1975-
1989. 
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Quinn (1997), however, shows that changes in capital account openness are 
associated with higher long-run growth. Henry (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find 
that stock market liberalizations decrease the cost of capital, which leads to greater 
investment and increased per-worker output, at least in the immediate aftermath of 
liberalization.  
As Eichengreen (2001) points out that neither theoretical models nor empirical 
analyses has highly consensus on whether capital account openness has significant positive 
effect on growth. 
Edwards (2001) finds capital account liberalization has strong positive effect on 
growth for 10-year intervals, however, limited mainly to high-income countries. Using 
Edwards’s data, Arteta et al (2001) analyze the 10-year average of the growth rate for 61 
countries from 1980 to 1989, find the effects vary with time, with how capital account 
liberalization is measured, and with how the relationship is estimated. There is some 
evidence that the positive growth effects of liberalization are stronger in countries with 
strong institutions, as measured by standard indicators of the rule of law, but only weak 
evidence that the benefits grow with a country’s financial depth and development. They 
also find that macroeconomic imbalances that could possibly create avenue for capital 
flight such as black market premiums. 
MW Klein (2003) finds an inverted-U shaped relationship between growth and 
capital account openness with respect to income per capita. Middle-income countries 
benefit significantly from liberalizing capital account while rich and poor countries do not. 
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Henry (2003) shows when countries liberalize their capital accounts and stock 
markets, the costs of capital to industrial firms are reduced, and further boosts growth. 
Arteta et al. (2001) find only limited evidence of a positive growth effect when capital 
account openness is conditioned on law and order. Klein (2005) finds that capital account 
liberalization in countries with better institutions does promote growth.  
In contrast, Quinn and Toyoda (2008) find no evidence that capital account 
liberalization positively affects economic growth, even though it has a high level of 
institutional quality.  
Klein et al (2008) show a statistically significant and economically relevant effect 
of open capital accounts on financial depth and economic growth in a cross-section of 
countries over the periods 1986–1995 and 1976–1995, however, these results are mainly 
driven by OECD countries included in the sample.  
Henry (2007) points out, neoclassical theory predicts only temporary growth effects 
on a country’s transition to a new steady state, helping to understand that most papers do 
not find clear evidence for a relationship between capital account liberalization and growth. 
He criticizes most of the existing empirical literature by “analysing capital account 
liberalization at the level of the firm instead of the country provides greater clarity about 
the channels through which liberalization affects the real economy.” (p. 889). Bussière and 
Fratzscher(2008) find that a time-varying relationship between financial openness and 
growth for 45 industrialized and emerging market economies: countries tend to gain in the 
short term, immediately following capital account liberalization, but may not grow faster 
or even experience temporary growth reversals in the medium to long term. 
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G Bekaert et al (2011) show that the growth boost from openness outweighs the 
detrimental loss in growth from global or regional banking crises. The countries that are 
more financially developed or have higher quality of institutions experience larger 
productivity growth responses. 
Kunieda et al (2014) investigate the data from 1985 to 2009 for 109 countries, and 
find that empirical evidence indicating that capital account liberalization is beneficial to 
less corrupt countries, but is disadvantageous to highly corrupt countries. 
This paper examines the effect of capital account openness on growth using two 
measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and the Chinn-Ito 
Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had positive effect on 5-year 
average growth, and 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth, but 
insignificantly negative effect on longer-run growth. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the prevalent measures of 
capital account openness in the literature. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses. 
Sections 4 concludes. 
2. Measure of Capital Account Openness
2.1. De Jure Measures 
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Figure 2.1. Categories of AREAER 
Researches on the effect of capital account liberalization on growth are limited by 
data availability. The first commonly used data is from the IMF’s annual publication, 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (henceforth 
AREAER), from 1966 to 1995, whose categories are shown in Figure 2.1. It is often 
considered to be too rough, however, as the de jure 0, 1 indicator (hereafter, IMF_BINARY) 
of the presence of absence of capital controls take the countries substantially but no 
completely open with countries that are completely closed as one category. In addition, 
IMF_BINARY reports restrictions only on residents without any information about 
nonresident capital account restrictions on, e.g., inward foreign direct investment (see 
Quinn and Toyoda, 2008). 
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Another leading measure of capital account openness is created by Chinn and Ito 
(2008), called KAOPEN. Construction of KAOPEN is based on the four binary dummy 
variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are: i) variable indicating the presence of multiple 
exchange rates; ii) variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; iii) 
variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and iv) variable indicating 
the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. These variables are to provide 
information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide 
cross-section of countries.  
These studies have all made progress based on the original 0, 1 dummy. However, 
they still simply measure the presence or absence of controls in a given category. One of 
new indexes called CAPITAL was created and updated recently (Quinn and Toyoda, 2008) 
go beyond this limitation. Quinn (1997) constructs indicators on capital account 
(CAPITAL) and financial current account (FIN_CURRENT) regulations based on a coding 
of the AREAER text. They measure only if there is restriction, but how severe of those 
restrictions. 
2.2 De Facto and Hybrid De Facto/De Jure Measures 
De jure measures have the advantage of reflecting the institutional development. 
However, the capital controls on paper in many countries may be very strict, but there is 
no practical effect. On the contrary, many other countries are legally open to foreign capital, 
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but the actual transaction of capital is not so active. Then the de jure measure does not 
reflect the degree of capital market openness.  
On the other hand, the advantage of de facto measures is that it reflects the actual 
transaction of the capital, but it suffers from measurement errors. This justifies why hybrid 
de facto / de jure measures are developed (see Quinn and Toyoda, 2008).  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Index (TOTAL) may be one of the most widely 
used de facto indicators, TOTAL is calculated as the total assets of the state plus the 
liabilities relative to the gross domestic product. (Edison and Warnock, 2003), the 
convergence of external and domestic interest rates (Dooley, Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 
1997; Quinn and Jacobson, 1989). Sub-index of Control of capital movement and people 
of Economic freedom index from Fraser institute (henceforth, EF), whose rating starts at 0 
to 10 in three aspects: i) Foreign ownership / investment restrictions; ii) Capital controls. 
iii) Freedom of foreigners to visit. There are some other hybrid measures of capital account
openness in the literature (see details, QUINN et al, 2011) 
3. Data
This paper adopts two measures of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL(Quinn 
and Toyoda, 2008) and the version of KAOPEN(Chinn and Ito, 2008) in 2014. CAPITAL 
covers 94 countries for period 1955-2004 and KAOPEN covers 182 countries for period 
1970-2014. In addition, the data of GDP and population are collected from Penn World 
Tables version 9.0, which cover 182 countries for period 1950-2014. 
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I use two different measures of capital account openness for comparison, so there 
are two sets of regressions in this paper, one set of regressions based on data of GDP per 
capita, Population growth and CAPITAL, which cover 94 countries from 1955 to 2004, 
the other set of regressions are based on the data of GDP per capita, Population growth 
and KAOPEN, which cover 155 countries from 1970 to 2014.  
Table 2.1 shows the definitions and sources of the variables used in this paper. 
 
Table 2.1. Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable Definition and construction Source 
GDP per capita In 2011 US dollars PWT 9.0 
Growth rate of GDP per capita Log difference of GDP per capita PWT 9.0 
Growth rate of Population Log difference of Population PWT 9.0 
CAPITAL Measure of capital account openness Quinn and Toyoda(2008) 
KAOPEN Measure of capital account openness The Chinn-Ito Index(2015) 
Region Dummy 
Western Countries : 1 
Southern Europe : 2 
Central and Eastern Europe : 3 
Newly Industrialized Countries : 4 
Asia : 5 
Sub-Saharan Africa : 6 
Latin America : 7 
Middle East : 8 
North Africa : 9 
Tamura et al(2016) 
 
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the dataset. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics 
Statistics Number of  Mean Median Min Max Std Deviation 
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countries 
Growth rate of GDP per capita 182 0.04168 0.04326 - 0.16900 1.11667 0.08719 
Growth rate of Population 182 0.01842 0.01903 -0.19901 0.17625 0.01619 
CAPITAL 94 55.75915 50 0 100 28.9838 
KAOPEN 155 0.44129 0.30201 0 1 0.35874 
Figure 2.1 depicts CAPITAL from 1950 to 2004, Figure 1.3 depicts KAOPEN from 
1970 to 2014 and Figure 2.4 depicts the growth rate of GDP per capita for countries from 
1950 to 2014.  
Figure 2.2. Cross-country average of CAPITAL from 1948 to 2004 
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Figure 2.3. Cross-country average of KAOPEN from 1970 to 2014 
Figure 2.4. Growth rate of GDP per capita from 1950 to 2014 
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4. Model and Estimation
When there exist unobservable, country-specific characteristics, which might affect 
the dependent variable and might be correlated with the independent variables, fixed effects 
models are particularly suitable. Moreover, because these data are not from a random 
sample, but are the universe of data that are available, fixed effects models are generally 
appropriate. (see Hsiao, 1986 for detail). In addition, the datasets of CAPITAL and 
KAOPEN cover 50 years and 45 years respectively, there is no reason to ignore the time 
effects across time windows of 5 years, 10 years and 20 years. Henceforth we control both 
country effect and time effect in panel analysis, though most of the papers mentioned above 
do not take time effect into consideration, which might be misleading.  
4.1 Baseline models 
1) Panel regression∆𝑦$3 = 𝛽> + 𝛽'𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 + 𝛽7∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 + 𝛽N𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3 + 𝛽V𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3 + 𝜇$ + 𝜀$3
(3.1.1) 
2) Cross-sectional regression∆𝑦$ = 𝛽> + 𝛽'𝐶𝐴𝑂$ + 𝛽7∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$ + 𝛽N𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$ + 𝛽V𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$ + 𝛽X𝑅$ + 𝜀$      
(3.1.2) 
 (3.1.1) represents the baseline model for panel regressions, where ∆𝒚𝒊𝒕 represents 
the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, which 
equals log difference of GDP per capita; 𝜇$ represents country dummy. 𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 and ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3	  are the two core variables in baseline model. 𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 represents 
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the measure capital account openness(CAPITAL or KAOPEN in this paper) in the initial 
year for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, and ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 represents the change of capital account 
openness during period 𝑡. This paper attempts to examine if high level of capital account 
openness brings higher growth, and if capital account liberalization (change in capital 
account openness) boosts growth. 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3  and 𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3  are the control variables, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙. 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3 
represents log of GDP per capita in the initial year for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, and 𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3	  represents average annual growth rate of Population for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡. 𝜺𝒊𝒕: Error term.  
(3.1.2) stands for the baseline model for cross-sectional regressions, which is 
similar to panel regression (3.1.1), the difference is cross-section model uses regional 
dummy instead of country dummy in panel model. 
4.2. Estimation results 
4.2.1 Panel regressions controlling country effect and time effect 
This sub-section provides panel analysis for time windows of 5 years, 10 years, 15 
years, 20 years based on baseline model (3.1.1). Table 2.3 shows panel regressions of time 
window of 5 years, Table 2.4 shows panel regressions of time window of 10 years, Table 
2.5 shows panel regressions of time window of 20 years. Most of the previous papers do 
not control time effect, which might overestimate the influence of capital account openness 
on growth, hence both country effect and time effect are controlled in this paper. 
Table 2.3. Panel regressions of time window of 5 years 
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Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window CAPITAL(1955-2004, 55 years) KAOPEN(1970-2014, 45 years) 
Initial level of capital account openness 0.00012 
(0.00008) 
0.00056 
(0.00953) 
Change of capital account openness 0.00015 ** 
(0.00007) 
0.01310 * 
(0.00807) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.02880 ***
(0.00644) 
-0.02719 **
(0.01065) 
Average growth rate of Population 1.91480 ** 
(0.75018) 
0.94630 *** 
(0.35032) 
Number of Countries 94 155 
Number of Periods 9 7 
Number of Observations 783 1058 
R-squared 0.123 0.067 
F statistics/ 
P value 
23.783/ 
< 2.22e-16 
15.917/ 
1.3579e-12 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported 
Table 2.3 shows panel analysis of time window of non-overlapping 5 years for 
different measures of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample 
period of regression of CAPITAL is divided into 12 sub-periods 1955-1959, 1960-1964, …, 
2000-2004, and the sample period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 9 sub-periods 
1970-1974, 1975-1979, …, 2010-2014. Then the average growth rate of GDP per capita 
and the change of CAPITAL/KAOPEN are over these sub-periods, while the initial level 
of CAPITAL/KAOPEN and the log of initial GDP per capita are values in the first year of 
these sub-periods.  
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Overall, the significance and magnitude of the coefficients of regressions of 
CAPITAL and KAOPEN are very close to each other although they differ in sample 
periods. The coefficients on Initial level of capital account openness of both CAPITAL and 
KAOPEN are insignificant, but the coefficients on Change of capital account openness are 
significant for both regressions. The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 5 years 
would increase by 0.001% as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one, and 
the average growth rate of GDP per capita over 5 years would increase by 1.38% as the 
change of KAOPEN over five years increase by one.  
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are 
significantly negative, which means the richer a country is, the slower it grows relatively. 
The coefficients on average growth rate of population for both regressions are significantly 
positive, which implies the demographic dividend stands out in the short-run. These two 
coefficients are stand to the literature. 
Finally, we can safely conclude that the short-run effect of increasing capital 
account openness on growth is significantly positive even though the initial level of capital 
account openness has insignificant influence on growth yet still positive. 
Table 2.4. Panel regressions of time window of 10 years 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window CAPITAL(1955-2004, 50 years) KAOPEN(1975-2014, 40 years) 
Initial level of capital account openness 0.00018 * 
(0.00011) 
0.00688 
(0.00917) 
Change of capital account openness 0.00023 ** 0.01557 ** 
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(0.00009) (0.00753) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.04385 ***
(0.01066) 
-0.05320 ***
(0.00917) 
Average growth rate of Population 1.29780 *** 
(0.84676) 
1.07917 *** 
(0.41285) 
Number of Countries 94 155 
Number of Periods 5 4 
Number of Observations 374 510 
R-squared 0.254 0.262 
F statistics/ 
P value 
23.118/ 
< 2.22e-16 
30.896/ 
< 2.22e-16 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported 
Table 2.4 shows panel analysis of time window of non-overlapping10 years for 
different measures of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample 
period of regression of CAPITAL is divided into 5 sub-periods 1955-1964, 1965-1974, …, 
1995-2004, and the sample period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 4 sub-periods 
1975-1984, 1984-1995, 1985-1994, 2005-2014. 
The coefficient on initial level of CAPITAL is significantly positive, 0.00018 while 
the coefficient on initial level of KAOPEN is positive yet statistically insignificant, 0.00688. 
The same as the regressions for time window of 5 years, the coefficients on Change of 
capital account openness of both CAPITAL and KAOPEN are statistically significant for 
time window of 10 years. The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 10 years would 
increase by 0.023% as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one. And the 
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average growth rate of GDP per capita over 10 years would increase by 1.557% as the 
change of KAOPEN over 10 years increase by one.  
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are 
significantly negative, which means the richer a country is, the slower it grows relatively. 
The coefficients on average growth rate of population for both regressions are significantly 
positive.  
Table 2.5. Panel regressions of time window of 20 years 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Time-window CAPITAL(1965-2004, 40 years) KAOPEN(1975-2014, 40 years) 
Initial level of capital account openness 0.00024 * 
(0.00013) 
0.00980 
(0.01307) 
Change of capital account openness 0.00013 * 
(0.00007) 
0.01516 * 
(0.00721) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.03309 ***
(0.00564) 
-0.06547 ***
(0.00572) 
Average growth rate of Population 0.12572 
(0.53435) 
0.41092 
(0.39202) 
Number of Countries 81 134 
Number of Periods 2 2 
Number of Observations 139 232 
R-squared 0.537 0.112 
F statistics/ 
P value 
15.372/ 
2.0838e-08 
41.761/ 
< 2.22e-16 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported 
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Table 2.5 shows panel analysis of time window of 20 years for different measures 
of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample period of regression 
of CAPITAL is divided into 2 sub-periods 1965-1984 and 1985-2004, and the sample 
period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 2 sub-periods 1975-1994, 1995-2014. 
The coefficient on initial level of CAPITAL is significantly positive, 0.00024 while 
the coefficient on initial level of KAOPEN is positive yet insignificant, 0.00980. The 
coefficients on change of CAPITAL and KAOPEN keep significantly positive as that for 
time window of 5 years and 10 years. 
The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 20 years would increase by 0.013% 
as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one. And the average growth rate 
of GDP per capita over 20 years would increase by 1.516% as the change of KAOPEN 
over 20 years increase by one. 
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are 
significantly negative, and the coefficients on average growth rate of population for both 
regressions turn into insignificantly positive. And most of the regional dummies have 
significant coefficients, which implies the characteristics of economic growth within each 
region is very significant. 
4.2.2. Cross-sectional regressions 
In this sub-section, cross-sectional regressions are carried out to explore the long 
run relationship between level of capital account openness, change in capital account and 
growth. 
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Table 2.6.  Cross-sectional Regression: Growth and capital account openness 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient) 
Explanatory Variables 
CAPITAL 
1955-2004, 50 years 
KAOPEN 
1970-2014, 45 years 
Initial level of capital account openness 
-0.00015
(0.00009) 
-0.00946
(0.00633) 
Change of capital account openness 
-0.00015
(0.00010) 
-0.00124
(0.00404) 
Log of initial GDP per capita 
-0.00127
(0.00140) 
-0.00087
(0.00074) 
Average growth rate of Population 
0.55330 * 
(0.31138) 
0.89439 *** 
(0.22653) 
Region: Western Countries 
0.05913 *** 
(0.01978) 
0.03899 *** 
(0.00975) 
Region: Southern Europe 
0.06791 *** 
(0.02096) 
0.03914 *** 
(0.00906) 
Region: Central and Eastern Europe 
Region: Newly Industrialized Countries 
0.08731 *** 
(0.02127) 
0.06297 *** 
(0.01065) 
Region: Asia 
0.05635 ** 
(0.02440) 
0.04994 *** 
(0.00957) 
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa 
0.04363 ** 
(0.01857) 
0.01814 * 
(0.01017) 
Region: Latin America 
0.05220 *** 
(0.01790) 
0.03790 *** 
(0.00949) 
Region: Middle East 
0.03476 *** 
(0.01182) 
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Region: North Africa 
0.08049 ***  
(0.01943) 
0.04468 ***  
(0.01027) 
Number of countries 43 96 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964 0.934 
F statistics/ 
P value 
106.2/ 
< 2.2e-16 
113.6 / 
< 2.2e-16 
* p<0.01  ** p < 0.05.   *** p < 0.01. 
Table 2.6 shows cross-sectional regressions for different measures of capital 
account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample period of regression of 
CAPITAL spans 50 years from 1955 to 2004, and the sample period of regression of 
KAOPEN spans 45 years from 1970 to 2014. 
Contrary to the short run panel analyses, the coefficients of cross-sectional 
regressions on both initial level of CAPITAL and KAOPEN are negative though 
insignificantly, so do the coefficients on Change of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. 
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are 
insignificantly negative, and the coefficients on average growth rate of population for both 
regressions still keep significantly positive, 0.55330 for regression of CAPITAL and 
0.89439 for regression of KAOPEN. 
 
4.2.3. Estimation Summary 
We can clearly see the panel analyses based on time windows of 5 years to 20 years 
show that both level and change of capital account openness boost growth, especially for 
the latter, while the cross-sectional regressions show that both of level and change of capital 
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account openness do not have significant effect on growth in the long run (45 years to 50 
years in this paper). 
The results from panel analyses are consistent with most of the literature, while the 
results from cross-sectional analyses are consistent Bussière and Fratzscher(2008), they 
find that countries tend to gain in the short term, immediately following capital account 
liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in 
the medium to long term. 
5. Conclusion Remarks
The field of capital account openness on growth is very controversial, and the 
evidence is mixed at best. This paper explores the relationship between capital account 
openness on growth using two measures of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL 
(1955-2004) and Chinn-Ito Index (1970-2014).  
My results show the evolutionary effects of capital account openness on growth 
over time. Specifically, capital account liberalization tends to boost economy temporarily 
in the short run, while shows no long-run growth-enhancing effect. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is complex itself, 
the debate about it is still ongoing. Either the evidence of positive relationship or negative 
relationship between them are reported in the literature.  
Using data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and 
ratio of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to explore long 
run and short run causality relationship between income inequality and growth. My 
findings show there exist neither long run nor short run causality link between Gini 
coefficient and log of GDP per capita. 
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1. Introduction
The causal relationship between income inequality and economic growth is itself 
complex. Ongoing efforts to understand this causal relationship in the literature have been 
yielding mixed results. Theoretically, the causality between income inequality and 
economic growth could run either way and through different mechanisms. Some studies 
have either find positive relationships between them, while others find negative 
relationships or no relationship at all. Consequently, a number of important policy-related 
questions have emerged. These include whether inequality is harmful to economic growth, 
whether growth is good for the poor, and whether highly unequal societies experience 
slower economic growth than more egalitarian ones. 
1) On the one hand, about the causality that income inequality affects economic
growth. Some scholars believe that income inequality show itself to be beneficial, to some 
degree, in ensuring the efficiency of the economy, which enhances economic growth. Okun 
(1975) argues that pursuing equality could reduce economic efficiency. As we all know, 
high inequality provides incentives to work harder, invest and undertake risks to take 
advantage of high rates of return (Mirrlees, 1971; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). For example, 
if highly educated people are much more productive, then high differences in rates of return 
may encourage more people to seek education. In addition, higher inequality fosters 
aggregate savings, and therefore capital accumulation, if the rich have a lower propensity 
to consume (Kaldor, 1956; Bourguignon, 1981).  
As is well known, the Lewis model (Lewis, 1954) gives support to the argument that 
increasing inequality is not only an inevitable consequence of economic growth but also a 
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necessary condition for economic growth. The basic argument is that the savings are 
essential to increase productivity and boot growth, and then the income distribution 
towards top earners who tend to save and invest improve the economy growth. However, 
Kuztnets (1955) also points out that in a less-developed-countries context there is no 
guarantee that the higher income groups will save a significant proportion of their income 
in their own country. According to Todaro (1994), unlike the historical experience of the 
now developed countries, the rich in developing countries are characterized by spending in 
luxury consumption usually imported and saving abroad. 
While some researchers believe that greater inequality might harm growth. It is not 
hard to think of Keynes’ theory that poor people have higher marginal propensity of 
consumption, then income inequality will depress aggregate demand and economic growth, 
and even permanent income theory of consumption. Moreover, in the presence of financial 
bottleneck, different individuals to invest depends more on their income and wealth level, 
then the poor individuals may not be able to afford worthwhile investments. For example, 
lower-income households may choose to leave full-time education if they cannot afford the 
fees, even though the rate of return (to both the individual and society) is high. In turn, 
under-investment by the poor implies that aggregate output would be lower than the case 
of perfect financial markets. We refer to this view, first formalized by Galor and Zeira 
(1993, 1998), as the “human capital accumulation” theory. 
Benabou (1996a), Benabou (2000), Durlauf (1996), and Mookherjee and Ray (2003) 
provide additional theoretical contributions and Perotti (1996) and Easterly (2001) provide 
evidence in support of this link between equality, human capital and growth. 
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The most recent pro-equality evidence by OECD1 shows that when income inequality 
rises, economic growth falls. One reason is that poorer members of society are less able to 
invest in their education. 
In addition to the introduced channels above that income inequality affects economic 
growth, inequality can also generate greater market volatility and instability. One of the 
channels is through its impact on the generation of finance-driven business cycles 
(Galbraith, 2012). Some evidence of this has been seen in the much-debated relationship 
between inequality and the onset of economic recession. Both the Great Depression of the 
1930s and the 2007-2008 Great Recession were preceded by sharp increases in income, 
wealth inequality and by a rapid rise in debt-to-income ratios among lower- and middle-
income households (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010).  
Kennickell (2009) shows us some evidence from SCF data, which confirms that rich 
families hold riskier assets. In 2007 the top 10% of the income held 60.5% of the holdings 
of checking, savings, money market and call accounts and 50.3% of the holdings of 
certificates of deposits, but 90.4% of direct holdings of stocks and 87.9% of bonds, 51.9% 
of mutual funds and hedge funds, and 38.1% of tax-deferred retirement accounts, such as 
IRAs, Keoghs and 401(k) accounts. This obviously support the viewpoint that wealthier 
households hold riskier assets. This fact tends to support the viewpoint that income 
inequality being one of the factors in bringing bubbles and financial crises (see Lysandrou 
(2011)).  
1 http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/Focus-Inequality-and-Growth-2014.pdf 
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2) On the other hand, the evidence about causality between growth and income
inequality is also inclusive. Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that income inequality worsens 
in the early stages of economic growth and after reaching a peak, it declines at the later 
stages of economic growth, this is the famous “Kuznets inverted-U curve” as Figure 3.1 
shows. 
Figure 3.1. Kuznets inverted-U curve 
Kuznets explained that, excluding government intervention, there are two forces that 
explain the income inequality before taxes: the concentration of savings in the upper-
income groups and the industrial structure of the income distribution. The former yields 
inequality in savings, which, all other the conditions being equal, has a cumulative effect 
of increasing the proportion of income-yielding assets in the hands of the upper-income 
groups leading to larger income shares of these groups and their descendants. The latter 
force is the result of the process of industrialization and Urbanization, this is, economic 
growth accompanied by the shift away from agricultural activities.  
On one hand, the process increases the urban share in total population, which is 
assumed more unequal than the rural population. On the other hand, since average per 
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capita income of the rural population is usually found to be lower than that of the urban. 
Kuznets (1955), argues that this gap in relative mean incomes tends to widen the as a result 
of a more rapid growth of the per capita productivity in economic urban activities than in 
agriculture.  
Saith (1983) re-estimates the inverted U-curve using only the 41 LDC sub-sample, 
excluding the "outliers" (the poorest and the richest countries). He shows that a better fit is 
provided not by the inverted U-curve but rather by the an inverted-L the curve. Braking, 
Ahluwalia, Carter, And Chenery (1979) use a 36 LDCs The sample of 16 countries which 
are beyond the "turning point" estimated from cross-The country data and only Taiwan 
shows some evidence of experiencing the second The phase of the inverted-U curve. These 
findings suggest that, in the case of LDCs, the relationship between economic growth and 
inequality could be better described by an inverted-L curve rather than an inverted U curve. 
However, this discussion is focused only on the Relevance of the level of growth and/or 
the rate of growth. Also, the when conjecturing about the inverted L-curve, heterogeneity 
Among the LDCs is ignored. 
Later, the Fields (1991), using a papers Produced for 20 countries as part of a research 
project launched by the World Bank in 1985 and adding information of another 35 
countries, confirms his previous finding (Fields, 1988) that there is not a definite 
relationship between changes in inequality and the level or the rate of economic Growth, 
but that those changes seem to be associated with the "the pattern of growth". Further 
support to this view is given by Matyas, Konya and Macquarie (1998), who, using a two a 
panel data set of 47 and 62 countries, find that it is not the per GDP Capita which explains 
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income inequalities but rather the specific characteristics of a country such as social 
structure, political system, and natural resources. 
Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1957), and Pasinetti (1962) have predicted positive association 
between growth and income inequality. While Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), who find a significant and negative relationship between growth and 
income inequality. While Hongyi Li and Hengfu Zou (1998) suggest inequality does not 
harm growth. 
Ugo (2002) uses a cross-state panel for the United States to study the relationship 
between inequality and growth, and supports a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth. Been-lon Chen(2003) propose an inverted-U relationship between initial 
income distribution and long-term economic growth using cross-country data for 54 
countries from 1970 to1992. 
Guanghua Wan et al.(2006) analyze the growth–inequality relationship in post-reform 
China, finding that this relationship is nonlinear and is negative irrespective of time 
horizons.  
Grigor(2007) uses with data from the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, he finds inequality has significantly 
negative on growth.  
Christian(2008) suggests that under leftwing governments, inequality is negatively 
associated with growth while the association is positive under rightwing governments. 
Barro (2008) shows a negative effect of income inequality on economic growth, and this 
effect diminishes as per capita GDP rises and may be positive for the richest countries.  
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Dierk(2012) uses heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques to estimate the long-
run effect of income inequality on per-capita income for 46 countries over the period 1970–
1995. And find that inequality has a negative long-run effect on income, both for the sample 
as a whole and for important for different country groups: developed countries, developing 
countries, democracies, and non-democracies. 
Daniel et al(2014) find that higher inequality helps economic performance in the short 
term but reduces the growth rate of GDP per capita farther in the future. The long-run effect 
of higher inequality tends to be negative. 
Using data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio 
of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to explore long run 
and short run causality relationship between income inequality and growth. I conclude that 
a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between these four variables, and Gini 
coefficient exhibits a negative correlation with GDP in the long run. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 shows 
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data description
This paper uses Gini coefficient to measure income inequality, Log of GDP per capita; 
and Growth rate of GDP per capita, i.e., Difference of Log of GDP per capita, Ratio of 
Fixed capital to GDP and Ratio of labor income share to GDP. The data of Gini coefficient 
of China for period 1978-2006 are cited from Jiandong Chen et al (2010), and that from 
2007-2013 are collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), and Ratio of 
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Fixed capital to GDP are supposed to affect economic growth, the former is collected from 
NBSC and its time span is from 1978 to 2008 and the latter is cited from Haizheng Li et 
al(2014) and its time span is from 1985 to 2010. For exploring how Lewis model works in 
China, I collected the labor income share in national income, denoted as Labor_GDP.  
Figure 3.2 shows Gini coefficient of China from 1978 to 2013, which increases from 
0.3 to almost 0.5 in 2009, and then decreases gradually.  
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Figure 3.2. Gini coefficient of China from 1978 to 2013 
Figure 3.3 shows the scatter of GDP per capita and Gini coefficient, which is close to 
Kuznets inverted U curve, and currently China is entering the right leg of curve. 
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Figure 3.3. Kuznets inverted U curve in China 
Figure 3.4 shows Log of GDP per capita of country from 1978 to 2013. 
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Figure 3.4. Log of GDP per capita of China from 1978 to 2013 
The ratio of fixed physical capital to GDP from 1978 to 2008 in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Ratio of fixed physical capital to GDP 
Figure 3.6 shows the ratio of labor to GDP from 1978 to 2013. 
Figure 3.6. Ratio of labor to GDP 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
GINI LN_GDPP CAPITAL_GDP LABOR_GDP 
 Mean 0.379560 7.884651 0.862883 0.000346 
 Median 0.387250 7.881200 0.848942 0.000212 
 Maximum 0.487000 9.920197 0.971346 0.001128 
 Minimum 0.269300 5.945421 0.697870 2.87E-05 
 Std. Dev. 0.068374 1.267802 0.075884 0.000340 
 Observations 30 30 30 30 
2.1 Test for stationarity 
 We use our Augmented Dickey–Fuller test to test stationarity of the series of the 
variables listed above, and the results are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Unit root test 
Variable Notation P-value
for original data 
P-value
for its difference 
Order 
of Integration 
Log of GDP per capita LN_GDPP 0.25 0.028 1 
GINI coefficient GINI 0.77 0.002 1 
Ratio of fixed capital to GDP CAPITAL_GDP 0.25 0.002 1 
Ratio of labor to GDP LABOR_GDP 0.15 0.027 1 
As we can see in table 3.2, the P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis that the original 
series has a unit root are shown in in the third column, and P-values for rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the difference of original series has a unit root are shown in in the fourth 
column. And the order of integration for the data are shown in the fifth column.  
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Traditional model 
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Most of the empirical studies introduced in section 1 use panel data to study how 
income inequality affects economic growth, and they usually estimate the following 
equation: 
tsttsttt IneqXyyy εγβα +++=− −−−− 11 lnlnln       (1) 
where i  denotes a particular country and s  denotes time interval. The variable tyln
is the log of real GDP per capita so that the right-hand side of equation (1) approximates 
s-year growth in a country. On the left hand-side, stIneq −  denotes one measure of 
inequality (typically, the Gini index); per capita GDP ( ty ) is the standard control for 
convergence, and the vector X contains variable controlling for human and physical capital. 
And some studies(say Edgar Begrakyan and Aleksandr Grigoryan, 2012) study how 
economic growth affect income inequality, they tend to estimate the following equation: 
tttt XyIneq εβα ++= −1ln (2) 
where X  denotes the control variable vector, like industry structure variables, poverty and 
so on. 
However, both types of researchers just ignored an important fact that the causality 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth can be bi-directional. In this 
case, VAR or VECM model would possibly be better. 
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3.2. Co-integration and VEC Granger causality test 
Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated, if they share common trend(s). As 
Papana et al(2014) points out that the cointegration technique made a significant 
contribution towards testing Granger causality. Although co-integration does not provide 
any information about the direction of causality, if two variables are cointegrated, there 
should be causality in at least one direction (Granger, 1988). To this respect, a cointegration 
test can be viewed as an indirect test of long-run dependence (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
Causality in non-stationary time series (in mean) is typically investigated through vector 
error correction models (VECM) in econometrics, and it is subdivided into short-run and 
long-run causality. To explore the relationship between the relevant variables including 
GDP per capita and Gini coefficient, I conduct Johansen Cointegration test among I(1) 
variables: LN_GDPP, GINI, CAPITAL_GDP, and LABOR_GDP.  
Table 3.3. VAR Lag Order Selection 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: GINI LN_GDPP CAPITAL_GDP LABOR_GDP 
Exogenous variables: C  
Sample: 1978 2013 
Included observations: 26 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       0 286.0914 NA  4.43e-15 -21.69934 -21.50579 -21.64361
1 441.1026  250.4027  1.02e-19 -32.39251 -31.42474 -32.11383
2 467.5998  34.65017*  5.05e-20 -33.19999 -31.45801* -32.69836
3 493.4475  25.84766  3.12e-20 -33.95750 -31.44130 -33.23293
4 518.9297  17.64153  2.82e-20* -34.68690* -31.39649 -33.73938*
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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The lag length of Johansen integration test model is the lag length of VAR model of 
these four endogenous variables minus one. As table 2.3 shows, model of lag order 2 is 
selected under two criteria LR and SC, model of lag order 4 are selected under three criteria, 
i.e., FPE, AIC and HQ. Then I take the lag length of VAR model is chosen optimally as 4, 
then model of lag 4 stands out as the most selected. Henceforth the optimal lag length of 
Johansen cointegration test is 3 (the optimal lag of VAR model minus one). 
Table 3.4. Johansen co-integration test 
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2007   
Included observations: 26 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: GINI LN_GDPP CAPITAL_GDP LABOR_GDP   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.851532  90.65841  47.85613  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.633355  41.06638  29.79707  0.0017 
At most 2  0.419375  14.97902  15.49471  0.0597 
At most 3  0.031945  0.844125  3.841466  0.3582 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.851532  49.59203  27.58434  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.633355  26.08736  21.13162  0.0092 
At most 2  0.419375  14.13489  14.26460  0.0524 
At most 3  0.031945  0.844125  3.841466  0.3582 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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If the variables are cointegrated, a VECM should be estimated rather than a VAR 
as in a standard Granger causality test (Granger, 1988). Since VAR models suggest a short 
run relationship between the variables because long run information is removed in the first 
differencing, while a VECM can avoid this issue. In addition, the VECM can distinguish 
between a long run and a short run relationship among the variables and can identify 
causality in Granger’s sense. VECM shows two underlying causalities: error correction 
term, shows long-run causality; and lagged variables, show short-run causality, and the 
model for LN_GDPP, GINI, LABOR_GDP, and CAPITAL_GDP are shown in equations 
(3)-(6): 
∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3 = 𝛼' + 𝛽'$]$&' ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ + 𝛾'$
_
$&' ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ + 𝛼'$
a
$&' ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$+ 𝛿'$c$&' ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉'𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢'3 
(3) 
∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3 = 𝛼7 + 𝛽7$]$&' ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ + 𝛾7$
_
$&' ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ + 𝛼7$
a
$&' ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$+ 𝛿7$c$&' ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉7𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢73 
(4) 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3 = 𝛼N + 𝛽N$]$&' ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ + 𝛾N$
_
$&' ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ + 𝛼N$
a
$&' ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$+ 𝛿N$c$&' ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉N𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢N3 
(5) 
∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3 = 𝛼V + 𝛽V$]$&' ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ + 𝛾V$
_
$&' ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ + 𝛼V$
a
$&' ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$+ 𝛿V$c$&' ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉V𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢V3 
(6) 
where ∆ is the difference operator, 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^'	  refers to the error correction term derived from 
the long run-cointegrating relationship via the Johanssen maximum likelihood procedure, 
i.e.,
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𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' = 𝛽'𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^' + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^' + 𝛽N𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿3^' + 𝛽V𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^'                (7) 
and 𝑢$,3′𝑠 (for 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4) are serially uncorrelated random error terms with mean zero. 
Equation (3) will be used to test causation from GDP, ratio of fixed capital to GDP, and 
ratio of labor to GDP to Gini coefficient, and equation (4) will be used to test causality 
from Gini coefficient, ratio of fixed capital to GDP, and ratio of labor to GDP to GDP and 
so on. 
Table 3.5. VECM 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 1981 2007 
 Included observations: 27 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( )  
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1 CointEq2 
GINI(-1)  1.000000  0.000000 
LN_GDPP(-1)  0.000000  1.000000 
CAPITAL_GDP(-1) -0.605061 -10.25745
(0.17853) (2.23578)
LABOR_GDP(-1) -1232.146 -11799.58
(161.148) (2018.12)
C 0.516918 4.507590
Error Correction: D(GINI) D(LN_GDPP) D(CAPITAL_GDP) D(LABOR_GDP) 
CointEq1 -0.499287  0.052549 -1.663808  0.000533 
(0.16985)  (0.76558) (0.60659)  (0.00024) 
CointEq2 0.053301 -0.010794 0.134200 -4.13E-05
(0.01494) (0.06732) (0.05334) (2.1E-05)
D(GINI(-1)) -0.059356 -0.105297 2.777943 -0.000291
(0.29308) (1.32107) (1.04671) (0.00042)
D(GINI(-2)) 0.321095 0.731783 0.965776 -0.000566
(0.24893) (1.12206) (0.88903) (0.00035)
D(LN_GDPP(-1)) 0.085170 1.246492 0.149808 -0.000286
(0.08489) (0.38264) (0.30317) (0.00012)
D(LN_GDPP(-2)) -0.331663 -0.417720 0.605633 8.65E-05
(0.12128) (0.54667) (0.43314) (0.00017)
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D(CAPITAL_GDP(-1))  0.191770  0.283430 -0.116715 -9.01E-05
 (0.08492)  (0.38276) (0.30327) (0.00012)
D(CAPITAL_GDP(-2))  0.085645  0.251140 -0.081063 -0.000219
 (0.05999)  (0.27042) (0.21426) (8.5E-05)
D(LABOR_GDP(-1)) -493.8889  397.3477 1812.968 0.023835
(232.541)  (1048.18) (830.497) (0.33005)
D(LABOR_GDP(-2)) -186.1018  343.3875 1360.590 -0.314569
(291.499)  (1313.93) (1041.06) (0.41373)
C 0.010381  0.047407 3.71E-05 -1.05E-05
(0.00573)  (0.02583) (0.02047) (8.1E-06)
R-squared  0.736449  0.686828  0.509481  0.875855 
Adj. R-squared  0.571730  0.491096  0.202907  0.798264 
Sum sq. resids  0.001663  0.033788  0.021211  3.35E-09 
S.E. equation  0.010195  0.045954  0.036410  1.45E-05 
F-statistic  4.470941  3.509020  1.661854  11.28815 
Log likelihood  92.57076  51.91575  58.20088  269.6252 
Akaike AIC -6.042278 -3.030797 -3.496362 -19.15742
Schwarz SC -5.514345 -2.502863 -2.968428 -18.62949
Mean dependent 0.006170 0.140012 0.004557 -3.35E-05
S.D. dependent 0.015579 0.064417 0.040782 3.22E-05
  Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  7.34E-21 
 Determinant resid covariance  9.05E-22 
 Log likelihood  500.8905 
 Akaike information criterion -33.25115
 Schwarz criterion -30.75546
Table 3.5 can be divided into two parts, the first part is the co-integration equations 
part, while the second part is the error correction equation part. The two co-integration 
equations are  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 = −0.517 + 0.605 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 1232.146 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃 (8) 	  𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 	  −4.508 + 	  10.257 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 11799.580 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃 (9) 
As the (8) and (9) show, there exists long run equilibrium relationship between Gini 
coefficient, Ratio of fixed physical capital and Ratio of labor to GDP, and there also exists 
long run equilibrium relationship between log of GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to 
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GDP and ratio of labor to GDP. Then we can see there exist no long run equilibrium 
relationship between Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita.  
For test the temporal causality, I conduct Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald 
tests based upon VEC model shown in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6. Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald tests
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1978 2013 
Included observations: 28 
Dependent variable: GINI 
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
LN_GDPP  0.950908 2  0.6216 
CAPITAL_GDP  0.479882 2  0.7867 
LABOR_GDP  1.698443 2  0.4277 
All  9.701780 6  0.1378 
  Dependent variable: LN_GDPP 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
GINI  0.881276 2  0.6436 
CAPITAL_GDP  7.085170 2  0.0289 
LABOR_GDP  5.022048 2  0.0812 
  All  7.961938 6  0.2409 
Dependent variable: CAPITAL_GDP 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
GINI  6.982444 2  0.0305 
LN_GDPP  13.18490 2  0.0014 
LABOR_GDP  11.26572 2  0.0036 
All  23.14216 6  0.0008 
Dependent variable: LABOR_GDP 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
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GINI  1.709970 2  0.4253 
LN_GDPP  10.87571 2  0.0043 
CAPITAL_GDP  11.44861 2  0.0033 
  All  19.58939 6  0.0033 
The results shown in Table 3.6 about the temporal causality links among the four variables 
are summarized in Figure 1.7. We can also see no temporal causality link between Gini 
coefficient and log of GDP per capita. Bi-lateral temporal causality links exist between log 
of GDP per caita and ratio of fixed capital to GDP, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio 
of labor to GDP. Unidirectional causality links run from Gini coefficient to ratio of fixed 
capital to GDP, and from log of GDP per capita to ratio of labor to GDP. 
Figure 3.7. Temporal Causality Links      
4. Conclusion Remarks
In this study, causality link is investigated between Gini coefficient, GDP per capita,
ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio of labor to GDP in China from 1978 to 2013. 
Evidence from the study shows there exist neither long run nor short run causality link 
between Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita. 
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